Lightning Still Strikes:  Evidence from the Popular Press That Death Sentencing Continues to Be Unconstititionally Arbitrary More Than Three Decades After \u3ci\u3eFurman\u3c/i\u3e by McCord, David
Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 71 | Issue 2 Article 3
2006
Lightning Still Strikes: Evidence from the Popular
Press That Death Sentencing Continues to Be
Unconstititionally Arbitrary More Than Three
Decades After Furman
David McCord
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law
Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
David McCord, Lightning Still Strikes: Evidence from the Popular Press That Death Sentencing Continues to Be Unconstititionally Arbitrary
More Than Three Decades After Furman, 71 Brook. L. Rev. (2005).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol71/iss2/3
797 
Lightning Still Strikes 
EVIDENCE FROM THE POPULAR PRESS THAT 
DEATH SENTENCING CONTINUES TO BE 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY ARBITRARY MORE THAN 
THREE DECADES AFTER FURMAN 
David McCord† 
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that 
being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.  For, of all the people 
convicted of . . . murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as 
reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a capriciously 
selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in 
fact been imposed. 
Justice Potter Stewart, concurring in Furman v. Georgia, 19721 
 
I must arrive at judgment; and I can do no more than state a 
conclusion based on 10 years of almost daily exposure to the facts 
and circumstances of hundreds and hundreds of federal and state 
criminal cases involving crimes for which death is the authorized 
penalty.  That conclusion, as I have said, is that the death penalty is 
exacted with great infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes 
and that there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few 
cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not. 
Justice Byron White, concurring in Furman v. Georgia, 19722 
 
 
  
 † Professor of Law, Drake University Law School, and Director of the 
National Jury Center of the American Judicature Society.  The views expressed herein 
are those of the author, and do not reflect the views of the American Judicature 
Society.  The author thanks his long-suffering secretary Karla Westberg; his diligent 
corps of research assistants Jennifer Bennett, Brooke Burrage, Richard Mortenson, 
and Clarissa Rodriguez; and his colleagues who astutely commented on the piece, 
Professor Kristi Bowman of Drake University Law School, Professor Rachel Paine 
Caufield of Drake University’s Department of Politics and International Relations, 
Timothy S. Eckley, Esq., of the American Judicature Society, Professor Michael Heise 
of Cornell Law School, and Professor Gregory C. Sisk of the University of St. Thomas 
School of Law (Minneapolis). 
 1 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 2 Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring). 
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When the punishment of death is inflicted in a trivial number of 
cases in which it is legally available, the conclusion is virtually 
inescapable that it is being inflicted arbitrarily . . . .  [I]t is highly 
implausible that only the worst criminals or the criminals who 
commit the worst crimes are selected for this punishment.  
Justice William Brennan, concurring in Furman v. Georgia, 
19723 
 
People do worse crimes than this and they’re still alive. 
Defendant Michael Rush, primary participant in a death-
eligible murder, 20044  
INTRODUCTION 
This Article began not as a law journal piece, but as a 
modest project for posting information about death-sentenced 
defendants on a website.  The expansion of the project into this 
Article is a tale of startling, not to mention humbling, 
discoveries.  As a law professor who has taught a death penalty 
course for over a decade, read hundreds of death penalty 
appellate opinions, and written several articles on aspects of 
the topic,5 I am an expert in the field.  One of the things I 
imagined I could do as an expert was “handicap” death-eligible 
cases—predict which cases were likely to result in death 
sentences, and which ones were not.  In retrospect, it is evident 
to me that this conceit was based on a biased sample—almost 
all the cases I read were ones in which defendants were 
sentenced to death.  Rarely did I read a case in which the 
sentencer chose a non-death sentence, or a prosecutor did not 
pursue a death sentence.  Since most defendants who receive 
death sentences are good candidates for them (at least based on 
aggravating circumstances), assessing the likelihood of death 
sentences in death-sentenced cases is in the nature of a self-
fulfilling prophecy.  Once I began reading about death-eligible 
cases that resulted in non-death sentences, however, I realized 
that I had no capacity whatsoever to handicap death-eligible 
cases. 
  
 3 Id. at 293-94 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 4 Jason Trahan, Suspect in Slaying Says He Hit but Didn’t Kill; Plano Man 
Fingers Other Roommate; Officer Says Shifting Blame Is Common, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS, May 21, 2004, at 3B. 
 5 Most recently, see, e.g., David McCord, Switching Juries in Midstream:  
The Perplexities of Penalty-Phase-Only Retrials, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 215 (2004). 
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Of course, if this insight were simply about my 
deficiency, it would not warrant your reading this Article.  This 
insight can be broadened: nobody else can handicap death-
eligible cases, either.  In turn, this can be even further 
broadened into a crucial, legally-significant point: death 
sentencing in 2004 was so unpredictable that the 1972 Furman 
quotations above, from Justices Stewart, White, and Brennan, 
still exactly describe the death penalty system more than three 
decades later; and the street-level insight of defendant Michael 
Rush neatly captures the essence of the current system.  Could 
I prove to the satisfaction of the Supreme Court that the 
current system is arbitrary?6  Probably not—I only know what I 
read in the newspapers.  What the newspapers disclose, 
however, is a pattern so apparently arbitrary that it raises a 
strong inference that the current system is just as 
unconstitutional as the pre-Furman system. 
An obvious question is: Why rely on newspaper 
reports—can we do better than that?  The answer is “no,” we 
cannot do better than that, at least not without a national 
homicide reporting system that is much more complete and 
detailed than we have now.7  There is simply no system in 
effect anywhere in the country (other than in New Jersey8) to 
keep track of the occurrence of death-eligible cases, their 
factual details, and their resolutions.  Indeed, before the recent 
development of searchable online newspaper databases, there 
was no way to even attempt the task this Article sets for itself: 
to analyze through press reports as many death-eligible cases 
resolved in 2004 as possible.  While the newspaper results are 
  
 6 I could have chosen “capricious” or “unpredictable” as the key descriptor, 
but decided on “arbitrary” as the most legally descriptive adjective. 
 7 The federal government collects a great deal of information on homicides 
nationwide, but the information is not collected specifically for death-sentencing 
purposes.  Thus, the information is not detailed enough to be very helpful in making 
the kinds of subtle distinctions on which death sentencing hinges.  For an overview of 
the homicide data available through federal databases, see the Uniform Crime 
Reporting Program Resource Guide, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/NACJD/ucr.html (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2006) (follow the “Agency-Level Data” hyperlink). 
 8 At the direction of the New Jersey Supreme Court, the Administrative 
Office of the New Jersey Courts has been collecting detailed data on all death-eligible 
murders in the state since 1989, primarily to attempt to ascertain whether race 
influences death sentencing.  For a description of this project, see David C. Baldus et 
al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An 
Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1638, 1662-64 (1998) (explaining the study and its purposes, and adapting the 
methodology for use in a study in Philadelphia).  The details of this New Jersey data, 
however, are not available to the general public.  
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imperfect,9 they are still valuable; and for the time being, they 
constitute the best available data upon which to apply a 
renewed Furman analysis.   
My odyssey of discovery began when I undertook a 
second job as the inaugural Director of the National Jury 
Center of the American Judicature Society in 2004.  One of my 
first tasks was to create a website for the Center.  Given my 
interest in capital punishment and the Supreme Court’s recent 
affirmation of the importance of juries in death sentencing in 
the Ring10 decision, I decided to devote one section of the 
website to brief summaries of the cases of all defendants who 
were sentenced to death in the United States in 2004.  One 
might imagine that such a compilation already existed—it did 
not.  Nor was it easy to create.11  As part of this task, I began 
searching a broad query—“death /s [in the same sentence as] 
sentence”—in the enormous Westlaw “USNEWS” and the Lexis 
“USNEWSPAPERS” databases (which together constitute a 
compilation of articles from several hundred newspapers).  This 
search turned up news reports on three types of cases: where 
death sentences were imposed, where sentencers declined to 
impose death sentences, and where prosecutors chose not to 
pursue death sentences.12  
Curiosity got the best of me.  I began reading reports 
about the cases that did not result in death sentences.  I 
quickly felt my handicapping confidence severely shaken.  
Soon, it evaporated entirely.  Often I would read a news report 
and ask myself, “How could the jury not have imposed a death 
sentence in that case?” or “Why in the world did the prosecutor 
bargain away a death sentence in that case?”  On the other 
hand, occasionally I would find myself asking, “What induced a 
prosecutor to seek, and a jury to impose, a death sentence in 
that case?”  Those questions prompted further investigation 
and analysis that led to this Article. 
The Article proceeds in three Parts.  Part I analyzes the 
legal forces that have formed the current death penalty system.  
The analysis cuts through the jungle of Supreme Court 
  
 9 See infra text accompanying note 107. 
 10 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (holding that it is 
unconstitutional for a judge rather than a jury to find aggravating circumstances 
making defendant death-eligible). 
 11 See infra pp. 826-828. 
 12 As well as a multitude of inapt references, such as: “The two early defeats 
do not necessarily constitute a death sentence for the Ravens’ season.” 
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doctrine to the Court’s core goal in regulating capital 
punishment: achieving a non-arbitrary system.  Because the 
Court has never described what a non-arbitrary system would 
look like, Part I proposes a four-part litmus test for non-
arbitrariness.  The test asks whether the system 1) selects for 
death only the most aggravated, “worst of the worst”13 
defendants; 2) imposes death sentences on a robust proportion 
of them; 3) achieves a death-sentencing rate that increases 
with aggravation level; and 4) excludes the “worst of the worst” 
from death sentences only for merits-based reasons.  Part I 
  
 13 There is some agreement across the philosophical spectrum that if we are 
to have a death penalty system, it should select only the “worst of the worst” for 
execution.  See, e.g., James S. Liebman et al., Executive Summary:  A Broken System, 
Part II:  Why There Is So Much Error in Capital Cases, and What Can Be Done About 
It, www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/index2.html (2002) (follow “Executive 
Summary” hyperlink) (“Our main finding indicates that if we are going to have the 
death penalty, it should be reserved for the worst of the worst . . . .”); Symposium, 
Rethinking the Death Penalty:  Can We Define Who Deserves Death?, 24 PACE L. REV. 
107, 123-24 (2003) (Statement of death penalty proponent Professor Robert Blecker) 
(“[T]hese comments today are about the ‘worst of the worst.’  This is the substance of 
death penalty law. . . . We search for bad character, for evil, for the ‘worst of the worst’ 
criminal and not merely the ‘worst of the worst’ crime.” (emphasis in original)); id. at 
133 (death penalty opponent Professor Jeffrey Kirchmeier) (“[The system] is set up now 
to try to get the ‘worst of the worst,’ but it does not achieve that. . . . Throughout 
history, the goal always has been to get ‘the worst of the worst.’”); id. at 148 (death 
penalty researcher Professor Jeffrey Fagan) (“The ‘worst of the worst’ argument is a 
policy prescription that would minimize error rates. . . . It would be preferable to define 
the ‘worst of the worst’ and confine the use of the death penalty to those individuals. . . 
.”).  See also David Baldus, When Symbols Clash:  Reflections on the Future of the 
Comparative Proportionality Review of Death Sentences, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1582, 
1605 (1996) (urging that death eligibility be limited to “multiple killings, defendants 
with prior murder convictions, contract killings, police victim cases, extreme torture, 
and sexual assaults with particular violence and terror”); Alex Kozinski & Sean 
Gallagher, Death:  The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 31 
(1995) (quoting pro-death penalty Ninth Circuit Judge Kozinski: “[W]e would ensure 
that the few who suffer the death penalty really are the worst of the very bad—mass 
murderers, hired killers, terrorists.  This is surely better than the current system, 
where we load our death rows with many more than we can possibly execute, and then 
pick those who will actually die essentially at random.” (footnote omitted)). 
  The “worst of the worst” idea has worked its way down into “the trenches” 
of working lawyers.  See, e.g., James Merriweather, Penalty Phase Begins for Keyser, 
NEWS JOURNAL (Del.), Nov. 18, 2004, at B1 (asking the jury to consider his client’s 
alleged retardation, defense counsel said, “The death penalty, ladies and gentlemen, is 
for the worst of the worst.”); Vic Ryckaert, Details Revealed in Girl’s Death, 
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 5, 2005, at B2 (quoting local prosecutor saying as to girl’s 
murderer: “Capital punishment ought to be reserved for the worst of the worst, and he 
is a prime candidate for the ultimate sanction.”); Andrea F. Siegel, Murderer Sorry for 
Everyone’s Losses:  Family of 2 Slain Victims not Convinced of Remorse; Judge 
Considers Death Penalty, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 15, 2004, at 1B (arguing for his client’s 
life, defense counsel stated that “as a human being, he . . . is not the worst of the 
worst.”); Diana Walsh et al., Jury Recommends Death for Scott Peterson, SAN 
FRANCISCO CHRON., Dec. 13, 2004, at A1 (addressing jury, prosecutor in highly 
publicized Scott Peterson trial argued during the penalty phase, “Scott Peterson is the 
worst of the worst because he’s the kind of person that no one ever sees coming.”).  
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then analyzes the Court’s capital jurisprudence, along with 
other structural elements of the system, and shows how the 
potential for arbitrariness is built into the system in many 
ways. 
Part II, along with the Appendices, presents and 
analyzes factual evidence from the popular press.  This Part 
collects the most complete roster of death-eligible cases 
resulting in sentences during calendar year 2004, together with 
the richest factual summaries that could be compiled from 
online news sources.14  The cases are divided into three groups: 
those in which death sentences were imposed, those in which 
sentencers rejected death sentences, and those in which 
prosecutors chose not to pursue death sentences.  Part II 
develops a “Depravity Point Calculator” that analyzes and 
ranks defendants in all three groups along a continuum from 
most depraved to least depraved.  The analysis also considers 
mitigation evidence.  This Part then compares the three sets of 
cases using the four-part litmus test from Part I.  This 
comparison leads to the Article’s key conclusion: the news 
reports raise a strong inference that more than three decades 
after Furman, death sentences are still being imposed on a 
“capriciously selected random handful”;15 and Justice White’s 
description of the system’s operation is just as apt today as it 
was in 1972: “[T]he death penalty is exacted with great 
infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes and . . . there is 
no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it 
is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.”16   
Part III considers whether a renewed Furman argument 
stands any realistic prospect of acceptance by the Court.  The 
  
 14 According to official government figures, the year 2004 is typical, at least 
in the sense that it had approximately the same number of death sentences as the 
three years immediately preceding it:  2004—125, 2003—144, 2002—168, and 2001—
164.  See THOMAS P. BONCZAR AND TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF 
JUST. STATISTICS BULL., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2003 14 (2004), 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp03.pdf.  The number of death sentences each 
year for 1994-2000 was significantly higher, ranging from a high of 327 in both 1994 
and 1995, down to 234 in 2000.  Id. at 8.  The trend was generally downward, although 
with slight up-ticks in 1998 and 1999 over 1997.  Id.  It is impossible to determine 
whether 2004 was typical in terms of the kinds of murders that resulted in resolutions 
of the death penalty issue because no database, such as has been compiled in this 
Article, has been compiled for earlier years.  But there is no reason to believe that 2004 
was atypical, and this Article will proceed on the premise that 2004 is fairly 
representative of the way the capital punishment system in the United States has 
operated, at least over about the last four years.  
 15 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 16 Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring). 
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conclusion is that the odds of acceptance are long—but where 
there’s life, there’s hope.  
I. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
A. Furman Re-examined 
Before Furman, all but six American death penalty 
jurisdictions had a one-stage procedure for determining 
whether death sentences should be imposed—evidence of the 
crime was presented at trial, and the sentencer then retired to 
deliberate whether the defendant was guilty, and if he was, 
whether he should be sentenced to death.  Sentencers received 
little or no guidance on how to decide the death sentence issue.  
The other six jurisdictions (California, Connecticut, Georgia, 
New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas) had two-stage processes 
where the issue of punishment was considered in a separate 
proceeding after the guilt determination, but still with little or 
no guidance given to the sentencer.17  The Furman Court held 
both one-stage and two-stage systems unconstitutional.  The 
rationale for doing so was murky, however, because there was 
no majority opinion.  Rather, each of the five Justices in the 
majority wrote a separate opinion, with some overlapping 
rationales, and some rationales peculiar to particular Justices.  
The most commonly asserted rationale, partially relied upon by 
Justices Douglas18 and Brennan,19 and largely relied upon by 
Justices Stewart20 and White,21 was that lack of standards to 
guide sentencers resulted in an unconstitutionally arbitrary 
distribution of death sentences.  Justice Brennan summarized 
the nature of the unconstitutional arbitrariness: 
When the punishment of death is inflicted in a trivial number of the 
cases in which it is legally available, the conclusion is virtually 
inescapable that it is being inflicted arbitrarily . . . .  When the rate 
of infliction is at this low level, it is highly implausible that only the 
  
 17 See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) (noting that those six 
states had two-stage processes, id. at 208 n.19, but that under all then-existing 
procedures “the decision whether the defendant should live or die was left to the 
absolute discretion of the jury,” id. at 185, and that such standardless death penalty 
procedures challenged by the two petitioners “are those by which most capital trials in 
this country are conducted.” Id. at 221). 
 18 Furman, 408 U.S. at 255-57 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 19 Id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 20 Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 21 Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring). 
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worst criminals or the criminals who commit the worst crimes are 
selected for this punishment.22 
Justice Brennan thus identified arbitrariness as 
resulting from five components: 1) broadly drafted statutes 
rendering many defendants death-eligible; 2) a low rate of 
death sentencing; 3) “over-inclusion”—imposition of death 
sentences on defendants who were not among the worst 
offenders; 4) “under-inclusion”—imposition of non-death 
sentences on many defendants who were among the worst 
offenders; and 5) implicitly, lack of procedures to minimize 
over- and under-inclusion.  This has become the well-known 
Furman holding: a system that dispenses death sentences to 
only a relative handful among a large universe of death-eligible 
defendants, without guiding standards, in a manner that does 
not sufficiently correlate with culpability of the defendants, is 
constitutionally deficient. 23  
There was, however, another holding of Furman that 
has faded into relative obscurity in light of the Court’s later 
capital jurisprudence: the Court has the power to make a 
nationwide assessment of whether the death penalty system 
produces an unconstitutionally arbitrary pattern of results.  In 
order to do this, the Court can consider the death penalty 
system to be one national system and examine the pattern of 
outcomes, rather than consider the system by jurisdiction and 
examine only particular case outcomes.  Both the one-national-
system and pattern-of-outcomes ideas deserve further 
explanation. 
As to the one-national-system aspect of the holding, 
Furman was a case from Georgia, and it arrived with two 
companion cases, one from Georgia and the other from Texas.24  
The Court’s decision, though, was based on the Justices’ 
perceptions of how the death penalty system was operating 
throughout all of the country’s death penalty jurisdictions, not 
on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis.  Justice White’s opinion 
most clearly demonstrated the Court’s nationwide concern—his 
  
 22 Id. at 293-94 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 23 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188-89 (1976) (“[W]here discretion 
is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a 
human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and 
limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.”). 
 24 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972).  See also Jackson v. 
Georgia, 171 S.E.2d 501 (Ga. 1969), rev’d, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (death sentence for 
rape); Branch v. Texas, 447 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969), rev’d, 408 U.S. 238 
(1972) (same). 
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analysis was “based on 10 years of almost daily exposure to the 
facts and circumstances of hundreds and hundreds of federal 
and state criminal cases,”25 and this same perspective was 
shared by the other majority Justices.26  Further, not only did 
the Court’s language exhibit this nationwide perspective, so did 
its behavior: the Court simultaneously entered death sentence 
reversals in all of the more than one hundred cases on its 
docket from death-sentencing jurisdictions across the country.27  
As a result, all then-existing death penalty jurisdictions—not 
just Georgia and Texas—immediately recognized that their 
systems were invalid, both prospectively and retroactively.   
As to the pattern-of-outcomes aspect of the Furman 
holding, the Court implicitly realized that if it always focused 
on a particular case, there would always be arguably valid 
explanations for the result.  Even in the pre-Furman era, it is 
hard to imagine that prosecutors and sentencers believed they 
were acting arbitrarily in any particular death-eligible case.  
Accordingly, arbitrariness could only be identified through 
patterns of results.  This Article will refer to the one-national-
system/pattern-of-outcomes approach as the Furman 
“nationwide outcomes” holding.   
Since Furman, the Court has never re-employed the 
nationwide outcomes holding; indeed, the Court has only rarely 
decided cases that involved even a whole-state-system 
perspective.28  Rather, as will be explained shortly, the Court’s 
post-Furman capital jurisprudence has largely focused on 
attempting to remedy over-inclusion on an issue-by-issue 
basis.29 Yet the Court has never suggested that the nationwide 
outcomes holding of Furman is no longer good law.  Furman 
should compel the Court at suitable intervals to step back, 
  
 25 Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring). 
 26 Id.  See also id. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating death sentences 
are much more likely to be imposed against a defendant who is “poor and despised, and 
lacking in political clout, or if he is a member of a suspect or unpopular minority, 
[rather than] those who by social position may be in a more protected position.”).  
Justice Douglas did not limit these remarks to the systems of Georgia and Texas that 
presented the issue in Furman. 
 27 See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND 
THE AMERICAN AGENDA 37 (1986). 
 28 The one major case calling on the Court to use a whole-state-system 
perspective was McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 282-83 (1987).  The defendant 
presented statistical evidence of how Georgia’s system had operated over a large 
number of cases over a several-year time span.  Id. at 286.  The Court declined to take 
a whole-system perspective, instead concluding that arbitrariness had to be assessed 
on a case-by-case basis.  Id. at 319. 
 29 See infra notes 45-57 and accompanying text.  
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apply the nationwide outcomes approach, and determine 
whether “tinker[ing] with the machinery of death”30 has 
produced a system that delivers a non-arbitrary pattern of 
outcomes.  This Article will argue that the best available 
evidence shows that arbitrariness still runs rampant more 
than three decades after Furman.  
This is an appropriate moment for the Court to apply a 
renewed Furman analysis.  Adjusted for increased national 
population since 1972, the infrequency with which death 
sentences have been handed down recently—an average of 152 
per year for the last four years31—closely parallels the 
infrequency with which death sentences were handed down in 
the four years preceding Furman—an average of 103 per year.32 
During the last four years the death sentence rate per 100,000 
  
 30 This memorable phrase was coined by Justice Blackmun in his late-career 
jeremiad against capital punishment.  See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 
(1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).   
 31 See THOMAS P. BONCZAR AND TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS BULL., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2004 14 (2005), 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp04.pdf.  The number of death sentences per year 
since 1994 are as follows: 1994—314, 1995—317, 1996—317, 1997—277, 1998—300, 
1999—276, 2000—232, 2001—163, 2002—168, 2003—152, 2004—125.  The Bureau of 
Justice Statistics (hereinafter “BJS”) figure of 125 death sentences in 2004 is lower 
than the number found by this Article.  The reason is that BJS researchers do not use 
the “Death Row USA” reports to compile their figures.  Rather, BJS sends out a once-a-
year questionnaire to corrections departments and compiles the responses.  Thus, the 
BJS figures are subject to reporting oversights, and, in particular, are prone to missing 
resentences.  BJS compiles a list of names of the persons comprising its 125 death 
sentences figure, but will not share this list with the public, including myself.  
Telephone Interview with Tracy L. Snell, Statistician, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Bureau of 
Just. Statistics (Nov. 30, 2005).  Thus, it is impossible to compare the BJS list with my 
list to see who is missing from the BJS list.  It is clear, though, that the BJS list missed 
several death sentences in 2004, because each of the death sentences found by this 
Article are documented to have been imposed in 2004.  Probably the BJS figures from 
earlier years are consistently understated, as well.  But even if they are understated by 
fifteen or twenty sentences per year, the death sentence rate per 100,000 over the last 
four years would not significantly increase above 0.053.  Experts have assayed various 
explanations for the decline since 2000.  See, e.g., Mike Tolson, Fewer Killers Getting 
Sentenced to Death, HOUSTON CHRON., May 22, 2005, at A1 (suggesting increased 
availability of life-without-parole sentences, better trained and funded capital defense 
lawyers, skittish juries due to publicized exonerations, reduced pool of death-eligible 
defendants due to U. S. Supreme Court decisions, prosecutorial frustration with costs 
and appellate reversals, and greater prosecutorial selectivity).  Still, Richard Dieter of 
the Death Penalty Information Center sums up the state of knowledge:  “Something’s 
been going on in the last four or five years, but it’s hard to say precisely what. . . . You 
wouldn’t have thought a few years ago this is the way things were going to go.”  Id.  
 32 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 291-92 n.41 (1972) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (listing the death sentences in the decade of 1961-1970 as follows: 1961—
140, 1962—103, 1963—93, 1964—106, 1965—86, 1966—118, 1967—85, 1968—102, 
1969—97, 1970—127 (citation omitted)). 
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population was 0.053; the rate in the four years before Furman 
was a virtually indistinguishable 0.051. 33       
B. Toward a Non-Arbitrary System? 
1. Envisioning a Non-Arbitrary System 
Despite the Court’s disapproval of the then-existing 
death penalty system in Furman, and its voluminous capital 
jurisprudence in the ensuing three-plus decades, the Court has 
never specifically articulated its own vision of what a non-
arbitrary death-sentencing system would look like.  This is 
understandable for at least two reasons.  First, the Court is not 
a legislature—it does not have the institutional authority to 
specify a complete, best-practices death penalty system.  
Rather, the Court normally responds to challenges regarding 
particular aspects of particular death penalty schemes on an 
issue-by-issue basis; that is, it does not opine concerning what 
the best practice is, but only whether the challenged practice is 
so bad as to be unconstitutional.  Second, even if the Court had 
felt institutionally competent to articulate a fully-developed 
vision of a non-arbitrary system since Furman, such a 
formulation would have been difficult because the Court has 
been comprised of justices with widely divergent philosophies—
ranging from those who have thought any attempt by the Court 
to regulate this area was unjustified,34 to others who have 
believed capital punishment was inherently unconstitutional 
and unsalvageable.35  Even a moderately coherent doctrine is a 
lot to expect under these conditions.   
  
 33 The U.S. population in 1970 was about 203,302,000.  See U.S. DEP’T OF 
COM., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING tbl.2 (1993), 
www.census.gov/prod/cen1990/cph2/cph-2-1-1.pdf.  The U.S. population in 2004 was 
about 293,655,404.  See U.S. DEP’T OF COM., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATE AND 
COUNTY QUICK FACTS, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last visited 
Jan. 27, 2006). 
 34 These include current Justices Scalia and Thomas:  “In my view, that line 
of decisions [beginning in Furman] had no proper foundation in the Constitution.”  
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 610 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring, Thomas, J., joining).  
Also, Chief Justice Rehnquist:  “[J]udicial self-restraint is surely an implied, if not an 
expressed, condition of the grant of authority of judicial review.  The Court’s holding in 
these cases has been reached, I believe, in complete disregard of that implied 
condition.”  Furman, 408 U.S. at 470 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  And, Chief Justice 
Burger, Justice Powell, and Justice Blackmun were skeptical of the legitimacy of the 
Court’s efforts to regulate capital punishment.  See id. at 375-76 (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting); id. at 418 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 408-14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 35 These included Justices Brennan and Marshall, who wrote in every one of 
their capital punishment opinions that they would find the penalty inherently 
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Yet a vision of a non-arbitrary system is imperative.  
How can the arbitrariness of the system be assessed without an 
aspirational standard with which to compare it?  This Article 
asks the following question: Does the system sentence to death 
only, and a robust proportion of, the “worst of the worst” in a 
fairly calibrated way; and when it excludes the “worst of the 
worst,” does it do so for valid, merits-related reasons?36  This 
question can be broken down into a litmus test that consists of 
four sub-questions:  
1. Are all insufficiently aggravated criminals—those 
who are not the “worst of the worst”—excluded from 
death sentences?  
2. Is the death-sentencing rate robust among those who 
are arguably the “worst of the worst”?  As will be 
explained later, this Article will consider a 33 1/3% 
death-sentencing rate among the “worst of the worst” 
to be the minimum acceptable rate.37  
3. Does the death-sentencing rate increase as the level 
of aggravation increases?  
4. When those who are arguably among the “worst of 
the worst” do not receive death sentences, are the 
reasons rationally related to the merits of the cases? 
  
unconstitutional.  See Michael Mello, Adhering to Our Views:  Justices Brennan and 
Marshall and the Relentless Dissent to Death as a Punishment, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
591, 593 (1995).  Justice Douglas was probably in this category.  And Justice Blackmun 
became a convert toward the end of his tenure on the Court:  “From this day forward, I 
no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death. . . .  I feel morally and intellectually 
obligated simply to concede that the death penalty experiment has failed.”  Callins v. 
Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 36 Some supporters of capital punishment contend that the only relevant 
question is the first one, namely, does the system sentence to death only the “worst of 
the worst”?  These supporters believe that if a particular defendant is worthy of death, 
the fact that others who are death-worthy escape death sentences cannot make that 
particular defendant’s death sentence unjust.  See, e.g., Ernest van den Haag, The 
Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1662, 1662 (1986) (“If capital 
punishment is immoral in se, no distribution of it among the guilty could make it 
moral.  If capital punishment is moral, no distribution would make it immoral.”).  For 
most people, however, the idea that the distribution of punishment has no comparative 
or procedural aspects is disproven by a thought experiment involving a death penalty 
lottery:  imagining the names of all death-worthy defendants for the year inscribed on 
lottery balls, placed in a lottery hopper, and a specified percentage drawn at random 
receive death sentences, while the others receive non-death sentences.  
 37 See infra p. 819. 
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Not only does this test comport with common sense, it is 
also consistent with the most important themes of Supreme 
Court death penalty jurisprudence.  First, it is consistent with 
Furman: a system that met this litmus test would not employ 
unlimited discretion to impose death on a “capriciously selected 
random handful,”38 nor would it impose death “with great 
infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes [with] no 
meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is 
imposed from the many cases in which it is not.”39   
Second, this litmus test is consistent with the Court’s 
emphasis that death sentences must be proportionate to the 
offense.40  This sensitivity to scale is apparent in the Court’s 
unequivocal requirement that death sentences only be imposed 
for offenses including at least one murder.  The litmus test 
takes proportionality into account in several ways, most 
fundamentally through its requirements that death only be 
imposed upon the “worst of the worst” and be positively 
correlated to aggravation.  
Third, it is consistent with the principle that death 
sentences must be “reliable.” The Court has stated that death 
sentences must be “reliable,”41 but has never comprehensively 
defined what reliability means in this context.  It surely means 
at least two things, though: that the punishment of death is 
only proportionate to the worst crimes;42 and that a death 
sentence is not reliable unless the defendant has been afforded 
the opportunity to present mitigating evidence.43  As was 
mentioned just above, the litmus test takes the degree of 
aggravation into account.  Further, the litmus test takes 
  
 38 Furman, 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 39 Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring). 
 40 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (finding death is 
disproportionate penalty for rape of adult woman); Eberheart v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917, 
917 (1977) (holding death is disproportionate penalty for kidnapping and rape and 
citing to facts in state court opinion, Eberheart v. State, 232 Ga. 247 (1974)); Hooks v. 
Georgia, 433 U.S. 917, 917 (1977) (holding death is disproportionate penalty for rape 
and citing to facts in state court opinion, Hooks v. State, 233 Ga. 149 (1974)).  
 41 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (holding there is 
particularly strong constitutional interest “in the need for reliability in the 
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case”); see also 
Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 169 (1994) (holding due process interest in 
reliability requires defendant to be able to inform sentencer of parole ineligibility when 
prosecution contends defendant will constitute future threat). 
 42 See supra note 40. 
 43 See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (establishing principle that constitutionally 
acceptable death penalty system must provide defendant with opportunity to present 
mitigating evidence concerning character, record, or circumstances of offense); see also 
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606 (1978) (reaffirming Woodson principle). 
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mitigation into account in sub-question one—an inquiry into 
whether the defendant is one of the “worst of the worst” entails 
a consideration of mitigating evidence. 
Finally, it is consistent with the principle that there are 
constitutionally impermissible non-merits-based reasons for 
imposing or not imposing death sentences.44  Sub-question four 
of the litmus test explicitly inquires whether the imposition or 
non-imposition of death sentences rests on proper merits-based 
reasons concerning the aggravation levels of the crimes and the 
defendants, or instead on improper factors such as 
prosecutorial budgets, wishes of the victims’ relatives, and 
perceived appellate hostility to death sentences. 
While this litmus test is consistent with the themes of 
the Court’s capital jurisprudence, there are crucial ways in 
which the Court’s issue-by-issue case holdings do not 
consistently require a non-arbitrary system, and in key 
respects, affirmatively undermine non-arbitrariness.  It is 
necessary to examine the Court’s precedents as to each of the 
litmus test’s four sub-questions in order to see how these 
holdings have contributed to the maintenance of an arbitrary 
system. 
2. Does the Court’s Capital Jurisprudence Conduce to a 
Non-Arbitrary System? 
In the following four subsections, this Article will 
examine whether the Court’s capital jurisprudence conduces to 
or cuts against the four parts of the litmus test for a non-
arbitrary system. 
  
 44 See, e.g., Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36 (1986) (holding that race is 
impermissible consideration in death sentencing).  Presumably, at least two other 
bases that are impermissible in jury selection in all cases—including capital cases—are 
impermissible death-sentencing factors:  gender (see J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 511 
U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (prohibiting exercise of peremptory challenges based on gender)), 
and ethnicity (see Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371 (1991) (prohibiting 
exercise of peremptory challenges based on ethnicity)).  Also, it is impermissible for a 
sentencer to be influenced by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, 
prejudice, public opinion or public feeling.  See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 542-
43 (1987) (upholding jury instruction so worded, characterizing it as “a catalog of the 
kind of factors that could improperly influence a juror’s decision to vote for or against 
the death penalty”). 
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a. Does the Court’s Doctrine Assure that All 
Insufficiently Aggravated Criminals Are 
Excluded from Death Sentences? 
Assuring that insufficiently aggravated criminals are 
not sentenced to death has been the most consistent force 
animating the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence.  Most of 
the Court’s key precedents bear directly on this goal.  The 
Court has sought to achieve the goal of minimizing over-
inclusion45 in several ways, five of which are listed below.  
First, the Court has sought to decrease the likelihood 
that sentencers will tend toward over-inclusion.  The Court has 
required a special process designed to focus the sentencer on 
the monumental nature of the death-sentencing decision—the 
bifurcated trial with its separated guilt/innocence and penalty 
phases is now standard.46  Additionally, sentencers cannot be 
otherwise deflected from believing they bear full responsibility 
for the weighty decision to impose death.47   
Second, the Court has limited the universe of death-
eligible crimes in order to minimize over-inclusion.  At first cut, 
that universe is limited to one: murder.48  Beyond that, the 
doctrine makes clear that not all murders are death-eligible; 
instead, the definitions “genuinely narrow the class of persons 
eligible for the death penalty”49 in such a manner as to 
  
 45 For an extensive discussion of over-inclusion, see Carol S. Steiker & 
Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts:  Reflections on Two Decades of 
Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 366-69 (1995) 
(identifying minimizing over-inclusion as one of Court’s four goals).  See also David 
McCord, Judging the Effectiveness of the Supreme Court’s Death Penalty Jurisprudence 
According to the Court’s Own Goals:  Mild Success or Major Disaster? 24 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 545, 573-75 (1997) (arguing minimizing over-inclusion has been Court’s primary 
goal). 
 46 Technically, the Court has never opined that this is the only system that is 
constitutionally acceptable, but after the Court approved three such systems in its first 
post-Furman death penalty pronouncements in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 
(1976); Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 248 (1976); and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 
276 (1976), no jurisdiction has experimented with any other set-up. 
 47 See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1985) (holding 
unconstitutional jury instructions that could lead jurors to believe propriety of death 
sentence is determined not by jury, but by appellate court). 
 48 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 303-06 (1987).  There is, however, 
still a possibility that sexual assault of a child may be a death-eligible offense.  See 
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (stating a death sentence is disproportionate 
to rape of “an adult woman”).  Further, treason could possibly support a death 
sentence.  See George P. Fletcher, Ambivalence About Treason, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1611, 
1612 (2004) (“Treason still carries the death penalty, but that sanction is of dubious 
constitutionality.”). 
 49 Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877-78 (1983). 
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“reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe [i.e., death] 
sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of 
murder.”50 This is typically accomplished through the 
requirement of “aggravating circumstances.”51 
Third, the Court has minimized over-inclusion by 
requiring that potential jurors who are overly zealous 
proponents of the death penalty not be allowed to serve.52  
Fourth, the Court has minimized over-inclusion by 
identifying classes of offenders who are insufficiently 
aggravated murderers as a matter of law: those who are too 
young53 or too mentally compromised54 to be morally responsible 
enough to warrant execution cannot be sentenced to death.   
Finally, the Court has minimized sentencers’ tendency 
toward over-inclusion by requiring individualized sentencing.  
Mandatory death sentences are impermissible for any kind of 
murder.55  Rather, each defendant must have the opportunity to 
show that he56 is actually not among the “worst of the worst” 
  
 50 Id.; see also Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994) (narrowing 
“must apply only to a subclass of defendants convicted of murder”). 
 51 Alternatively called “special circumstances” in some jurisdictions.  See, e.g., 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 1999 & Supp. 2005).  Also, some jurisdictions perform 
the narrowing by defining only certain categories of murder as death-eligible, rather 
than defining murder rather broadly and then making death-eligibility turn on 
whether aggravating or special circumstances exist. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. Art. 
19.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005) (defining nine kinds of “capital murder”). 
 52 See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992) (“A juror who will 
automatically vote for the death penalty in every case will fail in good faith to consider 
the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require 
him to do.”).  The acceptable capital juror is one whose views would not “prevent or 
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his 
instructions and his oath.”  Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985). 
 53 See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005) (finding it unconstitutional 
to sentence to death offender who was less than eighteen years old at time of murder). 
 54 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002) (holding it 
unconstitutional to sentence to death offenders who were mentally retarded at time of 
murder); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 407-08 (1986) (holding it unconstitutional 
to execute an inmate who is insane at time of proposed execution). 
 55 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) and Roberts v. 
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976) (establishing this principle); see also Sumner v. 
Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 78 (1987) (holding unconstitutional a mandatory death sentence 
for a category of offender some believed might be an exception to the rule:  an offender 
who committed a murder while under a sentence of life without parole). 
 56 I choose to use the male-gendered pronouns because capital murder is such 
a male-dominated activity.  For example, only five of the death sentences in 2004 were 
imposed on women.  See App. D, DS 31, 50, 99, 106, 124.  Only five of the defendants 
spared by sentencers in 2004 were women.  See App. E, SS 15, 28, 32, 83, 111.  The 
highest depravity point score for a woman was 23 (PS 17), a score that was exceeded by 
thirty-nine men and equaled by four other men. 
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because of mitigating factors relating to the defendant’s 
“character, record, or the circumstances of the offense.”57  
Despite these five doctrines designed to decrease over-
inclusion, the Court’s record regarding minimizing over-
inclusion is actually quite spotty.  The Court has established at 
least eight lines of authority that undermine the goal of 
minimizing over-inclusion.  
First, the Court failed to act upon compelling evidence 
that many defendants were over-included due to racial bias.58 
Second, the Court failed to require that death penalty 
defense counsel meet any higher standard of effective 
assistance of counsel than defense lawyers in other cases,59 
ignoring the obvious fact that one of the major causes of over-
inclusion is ineffective lawyering in the very arcane arena of 
death penalty litigation.60 
Third, the Court failed to require any clear guidance to 
sentencers about how to decide whether to impose a death 
sentence,61 thereby raising the specter of over-inclusion (as well 
as arbitrary under-inclusion). 
  
 57 See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1149-50 (1994) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). 
 58 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987) (finding that a huge, 
unimpeached statistical study showing victim’s being white substantially increased 
odds of death sentence, all other things being equal (particularly if defendant was 
black), was insufficient to establish equal protection or cruel and unusual punishment 
violation).  Research on racial bias has continued to find disparities that seem to be 
race-based.  See, e.g., Regina Brett, Death penalty not colorblind, PLAIN DEALER 
(Cleveland), May 15, 2005, at B1 (summarizing a massive Associated Press study of 
almost 2,000 murder indictments in Ohio from 1981-2002 as follows: “Kill a white 
person, and you’re twice as likely to end up on death row as you are if you kill a black 
person.”). 
 59 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 668-69 (1984) (establishing 
two-prong test applicable to all criminal cases, including death penalty cases, under 
which defendant must prove:  (1) lack of reasonably effective assistance; and (2) 
reasonable probability that effective assistance would have resulted in a more 
defendant-favorable outcome). 
 60 See, e.g., Liebman et al., supra note 13, at 
www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/sectionVIII.html (“Egregiously incompetent 
lawyering . . . is responsible for about 40% of reversals at the state post-conviction 
phase of capital review and between a quarter and a third of the reversals at the 
federal habeas stage.”). 
  For more on the prevalence of ineffective assistance in capital cases, see 
Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor:  The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime 
but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L. J. 1835 (1994).  As to ineffective assistance 
generally, see William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland’s Tin Horn:  Doctrinal and 
Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91 (1996). 
 61 See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1001 (1983) (noting that, with few 
specified exceptions, “the Court has deferred to the State’s choice of substantive factors 
relevant to the penalty determination”).  Not only has the Court deferred on the 
substantive factors, it has also largely deferred on what procedure the sentencer can 
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Fourth, the Court has never undertaken a quantitative 
analysis to check whether the long lists of aggravators 
generated by most legislatures in fact render too great a 
percentage of murderers death-eligible.62 
Fifth, the Court has only considered whether a specified 
aggravator is qualitatively bad enough to support death 
sentences in two contexts.  The Court has struggled with the 
ubiquitous “heinous, atrocious, and cruel” aggravator and its 
variants,63 hardly requiring its over-inclusive potential to be 
narrowed much.  The Court has also weighed in on the culpable 
mental state required of felony-murderers,64 again with a result 
that is only partially designed to minimize over-inclusion. 
  
use in reaching the death or non-death decision.  Most notably, the Court approved the 
Georgia scheme in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 201 (1976), a scheme that left the 
jury entirely to its own devices in making that determination once it found an 
aggravating circumstance.  On the other hand, the Court also approved the 
Pennsylvania scheme that required imposition of a death sentence when at least one 
aggravator was found, but no mitigators.  See Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 
301 (1990).  The Court’s only real regulation of the death-sentencing decisional process 
is that it is unconstitutional to require jurors to unanimously agree that evidence is 
mitigating before the jurors are authorized to consider it in determining the sentence.  
See McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 442-43 (1990). 
 62 For example, detailed research on California first-degree murder cases for 
the five-year period 1988-1992 found that eighty-seven percent of defendants were 
death-eligible under a scheme with thirty-two death-qualifying “special circumstances.”  
Steven F. Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The California Death Penalty Scheme:  Requiem for 
Furman?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1283, 1327, 1331 (1997); see also DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., 
EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 268 n.31 
(1990) (finding eighty-six percent of murder cases death-eligible under Georgia law).  
 63 Such verbal formulations are unconstitutionally vague without a 
narrowing interpretation being imparted to the jury.  See Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 
463, 471-72 (1993)  (holding aggravating circumstance of killing with “utter disregard 
for human life” sufficiently narrowed by construction of “killer who kills without feeling 
or sympathy”); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654-55 (1990) (finding “especially 
heinous, cruel or depraved” aggravating circumstance sufficiently narrowed by 
construction that murderer “relishes the murder, evidencing debasement or 
perversion,” or “shows an indifference to the suffering of the victim and evidences a 
sense of pleasure in killing” (internal citation and quotations omitted)); Proffit v. 
Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255 (1976) (finding “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” 
aggravating circumstance sufficiently narrowed by construction of “the conscienceless 
or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim” (internal citation and 
quotations omitted)).  The Court could, instead, have required legislatures to specify 
more narrow, objective aggravators. 
 64 See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (holding major participation 
in dangerous felony combined with reckless indifference to human life sufficient for 
death-eligibility).  Instead, the Court could have required that the defendant either did 
the killing, intended for another cohort to kill, or knew well in advance that another 
cohort planned to kill.  See David McCord, State Death Sentencing for Felony Murder 
Accomplices Under the Enmund and Tison Standards, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 843, 884 (2000). 
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Sixth, the Court has permitted death-eligibility criteria 
to duplicate aggravating circumstances,65 thereby perhaps 
inducing the sentencer to over-include defendants for death 
sentences by counting an aggravating factor twice when it 
should only be counted once.   
Seventh, the Court has approved death-sentencing 
schemes (few in number, but mighty in importance because 
they include Texas and Virginia)66 in which mitigating evidence 
can only be considered by the sentencer in an artificial manner 
that may constrict the ability to give the evidence its full 
mitigating weight.67  
Finally, the Court has failed to require appellate courts 
to engage in proportionality review to identify defendants who 
are comparatively over-included.68  
As demonstrated above, the Court has repeatedly 
emphasized the importance of a non-arbitrary system in the 
years since Furman; nonetheless, many of its specific holdings 
have actually cut against these themes and conduced to the 
creation and maintenance of a system that does not exclude 
insufficiently aggravated offenders.  The bottom line is this: the 
Court’s jurisprudence incompletely and haphazardly seeks to 
  
 65 See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988) (holding acceptable that 
statute defining a category of death-eligible murder as “a specific intent to kill or inflict 
great bodily harm upon more than one person” virtually duplicated that language as 
aggravating circumstance in death-worthiness determination). 
 66 Texas is far and away the leader in executions in the post-Furman era with 
336 as of Jan. 1, 2005.  Virginia ranks second with ninety-four.  See CRIM. JUST. 
PROJECT OF THE NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND, INC., DEATH ROW U.S.A. 
WINTER 2005 9-10 (2005), www.naacpldf.org/content/pdf/pubs/drusa/ 
DRUSA_Winter_2005.pdf.  The statutes of both Texas and Virginia (as well as Oregon) 
define a few relatively narrow categories of death-eligible murders, but then make the 
death-sentencing determination hinge not on aggravating circumstances, but rather 
largely on a determination of the defendant’s future threat of violence.  See OR. REV. 
STAT. § 163.150(1)(b)(B) (2003) (jury must decide “[w]hether there is a probability that 
the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a 
continuing threat to society”); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(2)(b)(1) 
(Vernon Supp. 2004-2005) (identical language); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (2004) 
(identical language except with “serious” inserted before “threat”). 
 67 The Court has held that evidence of the defendant’s youthful age can be 
given full mitigating effect even though the jury’s consideration of it is strictly 
channeled through the future dangerousness inquiry.  See Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 
350, 368 (1993).  Prior to the ruling in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002), that 
mentally retarded persons are not death-eligible, even mental retardation could be 
primarily funneled through the future dangerousness inquiry.  See Penry v. Lynaugh, 
492 U.S. 302, 322 (1989). 
 68 See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 44-47 (1984) (rejecting contention that 
appellate proportionality review is required for constitutionality of death-sentencing 
system). 
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assure that only the “worst of the worst” are subject to death 
sentences.  
b. Does the Court’s Doctrine Assure that a Robust 
Proportion of the “Worst of the Worst” 
Criminals Will be Sentenced to Death? 
It is controversial to assert that sentencing a robust 
proportion of the “worst of the worst” defendants to death is 
more desirable than sentencing an anemic proportion to 
death.69  The argument from the traditional criminal law 
perspective for a robust rate is straightforward and powerful:  a 
robust rate is necessary for retributive, denunciatory, and 
general deterrent efficacy.  The three identifiable arguments 
for an anemic rate are not persuasive.  
The first argument for an anemic rate is that it is 
impossible to determine the “worst of the worst” defendants.  It 
looks only at the crimes and the past criminal history of 
defendants, that is, at aggravation, and asserts that it is 
impossible to describe the “worst of the worst.”70  This 
argument is fallacious because it is quite possible to rank the 
aggravation level; while the cut-off between the “worst of the 
worst” and the “very bad” is gray, most cases fall outside the 
gray area.71 
The second argument against a robust rate is a slightly 
scaled-back version of the first:  the “worst of the worst” 
category is actually much smaller than it appears at first blush 
because the proportion of persons committing highly 
aggravated crimes who are morally blameworthy enough to be 
executed is very small due to the prevalence of wretched 
  
69 The abolitionist position that no proportion should be death-sentenced is 
beside the point because the issue is whether the death penalty system is working non-
arbitrarily in thirty-eight states and in the federal system.  In the interest of 
disclosure, the reader should know that the author subscribes to this position, but has 
set it aside for purposes of this Article.  The non-death penalty states form two clusters 
and three individual states.  The New England cluster includes Maine, Massachusetts, 
Rhode Island, and Vermont.  The upper Midwest cluster includes Iowa, Michigan, 
Minnesota, North Dakota, and Wisconsin.  The three other states are Alaska, Hawaii, 
and West Virginia. 
 70 A well-known statement of this position comes from McGautha v. 
California, 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971):  “To identify before the fact those characteristics 
of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to 
express these characteristics in language which can be fairly understood and applied 
by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are beyond present human 
ability.”  Id. 
 71 See infra pp. 833-840, and Chart 1 on p. 847.  
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upbringings, mental illness or retardation, drug or alcohol 
impairment, or similar mitigating circumstances or conditions 
among this group.72  Essentially, this argument is that 
mitigation will trump aggravation most of the time, no matter 
how aggravated the crimes.  How persuasive this is depends on 
how committed one is to a belief in free will.  After subtracting 
out young and mentally retarded offenders—as the Court has 
correctly done73—the argument for free will/just deserts has 
seemed compelling to the American public, as the widespread 
and tenacious existence of capital punishment demonstrates.  
Thus, this second argument against a robust death-sentencing 
rate is actually a thinly disguised abolition argument that does 
not effectively demonstrate any advantages of an anemic over a 
robust rate. 
The third argument for an anemic death-sentencing 
rate among the “worst of the worst” was articulated more than 
twenty years ago by Professor Robert Weisberg: 
There may never be a social consensus on the role of capital 
punishment, but a social engineer might try to identify a sort of 
culturally optimal number of executions that would best compromise 
among the competing demands made by the different constituencies 
of the criminal justice system. 
The most obvious approach is to have some executions, but not very 
many.  A small number of executions offers a logical, if crude, 
compromise between the extreme groups who want either no 
executions or as many as possible.  It would also satisfy those who 
believe that execution is appropriate only for a small number of 
especially blameworthy killers, at least if the right ones are selected.  
It might further satisfy those who do not believe there is a 
discernible and small category of most blameworthy killers, but who 
believe that a small number of executions might adequately serve 
general deterrence and make a necessary political statement about 
society’s attitude toward crime.  But our hypothetical social engineer 
would want to consider other points of view or factors as well in 
designing his culturally optimal number.  Too many executions 
would inure the populace to the fact of state killing and thereby 
deprive the death penalty of its value as a social symbol.  Or too 
many executions might have the opposite effect of morally offending 
people with the spectacle of a bloodbath.  On the other hand, if the 
number were too low in comparison with the number of murders, 
  
 72 See, e.g., Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder:  Social 
Histories and the Logic of Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 608 (1995) (“These, 
then, are some of the elements of the social histories that produce capital violence:  
Family poverty and deprivation, childhood neglect, emotional and physical abuse, 
institutional failure and mistreatment in the juvenile and adult correctional system.”). 
 73 See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.  
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capital punishment might not serve general deterrence.  Or if we 
execute too few people, we may not produce a big enough statistical 
sample to prove that the death penalty meets any tests of rationality 
or nondiscrimination. . . . 
Viewing the statistics of the last decade, one might imagine that in a 
rough, systemic way, judges have indeed manipulated death penalty 
doctrine to achieve a culturally optimal number of executions.  That 
number is very close to zero, but it must be viewed in light of a very 
different number—the number of death sentences. 
If we somewhat fancifully treat the judiciary as a single and 
calculating mind, we could say that it has conceived a fiendishly 
clever way of satisfying the competing demands on the death 
penalty:  We will sentence vast numbers of murderers to death, but 
execute virtually none of them.74 
Twenty-plus years after this excerpt was penned, it only 
needs slight amendment—vast numbers of murderers are not 
sentenced to death, but the turtle’s pace of executions has 
caused a vast pile-up on death row (more than 3400 at last 
count).75 
Professor Weisberg’s reasoning may more closely 
approximate the Court’s actual agenda than this Article’s 
assertion that the Court has pursued a non-arbitrary system.  
Since several Justices were abolitionists, and “some, if not 
most, of the Justices of the Supreme Court—past and present—
are or have been ambivalent about capital punishment, at least 
when confronted with actual death row inmates in real cases,”76 
the Court’s actual goal may simply have been to create a strict 
filtration system that permits only a few cases to make it to 
execution (the system would be even stricter if the more 
conservative Justices were not able to regularly muster a 
majority).  Under this view, the Court has not sought to 
achieve a system that selects a robust proportion of the “worst 
of the worst” in increasing ratio as the level of aggravation 
rises, but rather to achieve a system in which the smallest 
possible number of the “worst of the worst” are executed 
without the Court having to stick its neck out by ruling capital 
punishment irreparably unconstitutional.  But one hopes the 
Court has been acting in a more principled fashion.  All in all, 
  
 74 Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 305, 386-87. 
 75 To be exact, 3455, according to the CRIM. JUST. PROJECT OF THE NAACP 
LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND, INC., DEATH ROW U.S.A. WINTER 2005 1 (2005), 
www.naacpldf.org/content/pdf/pubs/drusa/DRUSA_Winter_2005.pdf.  
 76 Stephen R. McAllister, The Problem of Implementing a Constitutional 
System of Capital Punishment, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 1039, 1064 (1995). 
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arguments that only an anemic proportion of the “worst of the 
worst” should be sentenced to death are unpersuasive. 
The Furman Court seemed committed to the proposition 
that one of the hallmarks of a non-arbitrary system would be 
that it imposed death sentences on a robust proportion of those 
who were eligible:  
In Furman, the Justices’ conclusion that the death penalty was 
imposed only infrequently derived from their understanding that 
only 15-20% of convicted murderers who were death-eligible were 
being sentenced to death. . . .  In Gregg, the plurality reiterated this 
understanding. . . .  While the Court did not indicate in Furman and 
Gregg what death sentence ratio (actual death sentences per 
convicted death-eligible murderers) a state scheme would have to 
produce to satisfy Furman, plainly any scheme producing a ratio of 
less than 20% would not.77 
If 20% was deemed woefully inadequate by the Court, this 
Article will assume that a ratio would need to be at least one-
third—33 1/3%—to withstand constitutional scrutiny under 
Furman.  This figure is significantly greater than 20%, yet still 
leaves the system a large margin for mercy and imperfect 
operation.   
The Court’s emphasis in Furman on a robust death-
sentencing ratio was very prominent.78  Despite this supportive 
beginning for a robust ratio, four years later Gregg made it 
apparent that the Court’s concern for a robust ratio had been 
misread.  There are two decision-makers who can influence the 
death penalty ratio among the “worst of the worst”: 
prosecutors, who can exclude defendants from death-eligibility; 
and sentencers, who can exclude defendants from death-
worthiness.  The Furman Court focused on the ratio of death 
sentences among convicted murderers who were death-eligible, 
thereby possibly indicating that the Court was concerned with 
arbitrariness among both prosecutors and sentencers.79  The 
  
 77 Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 62, at 1288-89 (1997). 
 78 Indeed, it was so prominent that some states were convinced that it was 
the Court’s primary concern, and redrafted their statutes to make death sentences 
mandatory within the death-eligible groups—only to have those statutes struck down 
for failing to anticipate the individualized sentencing principle.  See Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976) (striking down mandatory death-sentencing 
scheme); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 335-36 (1976) (doing the same). 
 79 See Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 62, at 1288: 
In Furman, the Justices’ conclusion that the death penalty was imposed only 
infrequently derived from their understanding that only 15-20% of convicted 
murderers who were death-eligible were being sentenced to death.  Chief 
Justice Burger, writing for the four dissenters, adopted that statistic, citing 
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Court in Gregg, however, flatly rejected the idea that any 
constitutional oversight was due prosecutorial decisions 
regarding whether to pursue death sentences: “The existence of 
[this] discretionary [stage of prosecutorial decision-making] is 
not determinative of the issues before us. . . . Nothing in any of 
our cases suggests that the decision to afford an individual 
defendant mercy violates the Constitution.”80  This holding is 
short-sighted in two respects: 1) “mercy” is not the only reason 
that prosecutors could decide not to pursue death sentences—
other less noble reasons are not hard to imagine; and 2) as 
noble as the idea of “mercy” sounds, if it is dispensed on the 
basis of nothing more than sympathy, or illicit concerns like 
race, “mercy” is itself arbitrary.  The Court nonetheless wrote 
an admiring testimonial to prosecutorial discretion a decade 
later,81 and has not revisited the issue.  The Court’s refusal to 
oversee prosecutorial decision-making is a heavy blow to robust 
death sentence ratios because significantly more defendants 
are shielded from death sentences by prosecutorial decisions 
than by sentencer decisions.82  Thus, prosecutorial decision-
making has always been, and remains today, the unopened 
black box of possible death-sentencing arbitrariness.  
Even as to sentencer discretion, the Court’s concern was 
short-lived.  Post-Gregg the Court has never entertained a 
challenge to a death-sentencing system based on an 
insufficiently robust death-sentencing ratio, despite 
  
to four sources.  Justice Stewart, in turn, cited to the Chief Justice’s 
statement as support for his conclusion that the imposition of death was 
“unusual.”   
Id. Since the decisions of prosecutors not to seek death sentences for death-eligible 
convicted murderers is one of the two factors—together with sentencer decisions not to 
impose death sentences—affecting this ratio, there was reason to believe the Court was 
concerned with the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 
 80 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976). 
 81 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311-12 (1987) (citations omitted): 
Discretion in the criminal justice system offers substantial benefits to a 
criminal defendant. . . .  As we have noted, a prosecutor can decline to charge, 
offer a plea bargain, or decline to seek a death sentence in any particular 
case.  Of course, “the power to be lenient [also] is the power to discriminate,” 
but a capital punishment system that did not allow for discretionary acts of 
leniency “would be totally alien to our notions of criminal justice.” 
Id. 
 82 See App. E (120 defendants spared by sentencers); App. F (323 defendants 
spared by prosecutors). 
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opportunities to do so.83  In fact, the Court struck a blow 
against the possibility of a robust death-sentencing ratio when 
it ruled that each juror is free to come to that juror’s own 
conclusion that evidence is mitigating, without convincing any 
other juror to accept this way of thinking.84  The Court’s failure 
to enforce a robust death-sentencing rate means that more of 
the “worst of the worst” will escape death sentences, which 
adds to the arbitrariness of the system. 
c. Does the Court’s Doctrine Consider Whether 
the Death Sentence Rate Increases with the 
Aggravation Level? 
The Court has never considered whether the death 
sentence ratio increases with aggravation level.  One of the 
best possible indicators that the system is fairly calibrated and 
non-arbitrary, however, would be that the more aggravated a 
criminal, the more likely that criminal is to receive a death 
sentence.  (This assumes that mitigation does not tend to 
increase along with aggravation, a proposition that will be 
established later.85)  Thus, while there should be a robust 
death-sentencing ratio for all sufficiently aggravated criminals, 
one would expect that ratio to increase with the aggravation 
level in a fairly calibrated system.  The Court’s failure to 
articulate this ideal allows legislatures and lower courts to 
avoid shaping systems to reflect this feature of a non-arbitrary 
system and thereby adds further to the system’s arbitrariness 
nationwide. 
  
 83 See Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 62, at 1296-99 (noting that no 
quantitative narrowing challenges have reached the Court).  Certiorari was sought and 
denied in at least one case, litigated by Professor Rivkind herself.  See People v. 
Sanchez, 906 P.2d 1129 (Cal. 1995), cert. denied, Sanchez v. California, 519 U.S. 835 
(1996).  Of course, it goes against the grain of capital defense lawyers to argue that the 
system is unconstitutional because too few death sentences are being imposed.  
Occasionally, though, a lawyer overcomes this mental hurdle.  See, e.g., Lynne Tuohy, 
Some Heinous Killers Given Life Sentences, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 16, 2005, at A1 
(lawyer for condemned killer argued in a 142-page brief that the client was arbitrarily 
selected for death in view of the fact that so many other heinous killers had received 
life sentences). 
 84 The Court’s doctrine is narrower than this, holding only that it is 
unconstitutional for a death-sentencing scheme to require the jurors to unanimously 
find evidence to be mitigating before it can be considered in the sentencing balance.  
See McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 443-44 (1990); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 
367, 384 (1988).  But extant death-sentencing schemes do not require any sort of 
concurrence among jurors concerning whether evidence is mitigating, effectively 
leaving each juror to decide this individually. 
 85 See infra p. 841-42. 
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d. Does The Court’s Doctrine Assure that When 
the “Worst of the Worst” Are Spared Death 
Sentences, It Is for Valid, Merits-Based 
Reasons? 
The only non-arbitrary reason for sparing an offender 
arguably within the “worst of the worst” category is that he is 
not provably one of the “worst of the worst.”  There will often be 
close issues about whether a defendant belongs in that 
category, and sparing the defendant is appropriate when the 
decision-maker’s best analysis, based on the merits of the case, 
is that the defendant is not one of the “worst of the worst.”  The 
key, however, is that to be non-arbitrary such a decision must 
be based on the merits of the case, either in terms of the ability 
to prove the case, or of the weight of the aggravators against 
the mitigators.  The decision should not be based on extraneous 
factors such as prosecutorial budgets, wishes of the victim’s 
survivors, or a whole host of other possible factors discussed in 
more detail later.86  Because the Court has declined to oversee 
prosecutorial death sentence decision-making, or to put many 
constraints on sentencer decision-making, the possibility of 
arbitrariness is very real. 
3. Additional Structural Factors Conducing to 
Arbitrariness 
In addition to the Court’s fragmented doctrine, there are 
four additional structural factors, not of the Court’s making, 
built into the death penalty system that conduce to 
arbitrariness.  
First, local county-level prosecutorial decision-making 
authority concerning whether to pursue death sentences 
contributes to arbitrariness.  In only two jurisdictions does an 
official with jurisdiction-wide authority make death penalty 
decisions: Delaware,87 which gives the power to the Delaware 
  
 86 See infra pp. 856-863.  Race, of course, looms large as an issue in capital 
punishment.  Unfortunately, no analysis based on either race-of-defendant or race-of-
victim, or interaction of the two, is possible from these data.  The only racial data 
known is the race-of-defendant information from the  NAACP “Death Row USA” 
reports, see http://www.naacpldf.org (follow “Publications” hyperlink; then follow 
“Death Row USA” hyperlink); infra text at page 826, for the defendants in Appendix D 
who were sentenced to death.  The race-of-defendant information is not available for 
the defendants who were spared by sentencers or by prosecutors in Appendices E and 
F.  Race-of-victim information is not available for any of the three sets of defendants.  
 87 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 29-2504(6) (Michie 2003).  
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Attorney General, and the federal system, which gives the 
power to the U.S. Attorney General.88  Obviously, dispersed 
decision-making authority leads to wide disparities in decisions 
about whether to seek death sentences in similar cases.  These 
disparities are exacerbated by the fact that funding of 
prosecutors’ offices is also largely at the county level, which 
puts severe constraints on some counties’ abilities to fund 
expensive death prosecutions.89  Likewise, funding for indigent 
defense in death cases is also often at the county level, again 
causing financial implications to loom large, or defenses to be 
under-funded. 
Second, lack of any legislative regulation of the power of 
local prosecutors to pursue or not pursue death penalty 
sentences is problematic.  When prosecutors have unfettered 
discretion to pursue death sentences, one would expect some 
death sentences to be pursued when death is not warranted, 
and some not to be pursued when death is warranted.  Just as 
there are no judicial constraints on prosecutors’ powers, there 
are likewise no legislative constraints.  The Indiana House of 
Representatives recently made news by proposing such a 
constraint—a bill mandating that county prosecutors seek a 
death sentence for child murderers under some 
circumstances—and predictably, prosecutors have objected.90  
The requirement of a unanimous jury verdict for a death 
sentence also conduces to arbitrariness of the current system.  
Of the thirty-nine death penalty jurisdictions (thirty-eight 
states and the federal government), all but five rely on juries to 
determine death sentences.91  All jury-sentencing jurisdictions 
  
 88 See UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUST., THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM:  
A STATISTICAL SURVEY (1988-2000) 2 (2000), http://www.usdoj.gov/dag 
/pubdoc/_dp_survey_final.pdf (explaining the procedure under a 1995 protocol requiring 
U.S. Attorneys to bring a death-eligible case for review by the Attorney General’s Office 
to determine whether a death sentence should be sought).  
 89 See infra notes 189-190 and accompanying text for further discussion. 
 90 See Niki Kelly, General Assembly: Death for Killers of Children?  Measure 
Passes House, but Prosecutors Object, J. GAZETTE, Feb. 18, 2005, at 1 (explaining bill 
and prosecutors’ objections to it). 
 91 The Court in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 608 n.6 (2002), identified the 
sentencers in the thirty-eight death penalty states as follows:  twenty-nine used jury 
sentencing; four used systems in which the jury rendered an advisory verdict, with the 
judge making the ultimate sentencing recommendation (Alabama, Delaware, Florida, 
and Indiana); and five had systems in which both aggravating circumstance fact-
finding and death sentence decision-making was left to a judge (Arizona, Colorado 
(three-judge panel), Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska).  Id. Ring held the latter five 
systems unconstitutional because they denied defendants the right to a jury trial on 
the existence of aggravating circumstances, id. at 609, although apparently it is still 
constitutional for a judge to make the sentencing decision after a jury has found 
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require a unanimous jury verdict for death, and in most of 
those jurisdictions a hung jury results in an automatic non-
death sentence with no opportunity for the prosecution to retry 
the penalty phase.92  This puts veto power over a death 
sentence in the hands of each individual member of the jury, 
and hung juries are quite common in penalty phase decisions, 
often with counts of eleven to one or ten to two for death.  
Clearly, this allocation of power cannot be expected to produce 
non-arbitrary results.  
Finally, arbitrariness is further supported by the wildly 
varying state appellate and federal habeas corpus93 reversal 
rates of death sentences.  Higher court94 reversals of death 
sentences have a huge impact on death-sentencing rates 
because usually when a death sentence is reversed, it is not re-
imposed.95  Further, the fear of reversal undoubtedly causes 
many prosecutors to forego seeking death sentences in many 
death-eligible cases.  Reversal rates are high overall,96 but 
manifest huge variations from state to state. 97  It seems that 
  
aggravating circumstances.  In the wake of Ring, Arizona, Colorado, and Idaho 
switched to jury sentencing (as did Indiana), while Montana and Nebraska adhered to 
judge sentencing, but only after a jury has found aggravating circumstance(s).  
Alabama, Delaware, and Florida adhered to their systems of a jury recommendation of 
sentence, followed by a judge’s sentencing decision.  Thus, Alabama, Delaware, Florida, 
Montana, and Nebraska are the five states that do not rely on jury sentencing.  See 
Jeffrey Abramson, Death-Is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the Capital Jury, 2 
OH. ST. J. CRIM. L. 117, 148 (2004) (explaining how affected states changed capital 
sentencing procedures in the wake of Ring). 
 92 Arizona, California, and Kentucky permit the retrial of a penalty phase 
that ends in a hung jury.  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703.01 (2005); CAL. PENAL CODE § 
190.4(b) (West 1999); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025 (West 2004); Skaggs v. 
Commonwealth, 694 S.W.2d 672, 681 (Ky. 1985) (interpreting statute to allow retrial of 
penalty phase when first jury deadlocks). 
 93 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (providing for federal courts to entertain habeas 
corpus applications from state prisoners who allege they are being held “in custody in 
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States”). 
 94 In this context, all federal habeas courts are considered “higher” than any 
state court. 
 95 See infra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 96 An influential study found a sixty-eight percent death sentence reversal 
rate for all death sentences issued from 1973-1995.  See JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A 
BROKEN SYSTEM:  ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 1973-1995 1 (2000), 
http://ccjr.policy.net/cjedfund/jpreport/liebapp7.pdf?PROACTIVE_ID=cececdcec8cac9cb
cbc5cecfcfcfc5cecec6cbc6cecccbcdc8c5cf.  Two commentators have contended that the 
reversal rate is lower, but even the lowest estimate is forty percent.  See Barry Latzer 
& James N.G. Cauthen, Another Recount:  Appeals in Capital Cases, 35 PROSECUTOR 
25, 26 (2001) (arguing that reversal rate is closer to forty-three percent); Joseph L. 
Hoffman, The Harry Pratter Professorship Lecture:  Violence and Truth, 76 IND. L. J. 
934, 946 (2001) (suggesting true reversal rate is about forty percent). 
 97 See William S. Lofquist, Putting Them There, Keeping Them There, and 
Killing Them: An Analysis of State-Level Variations in Death Penalty Intensity, 87 
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some higher courts are so philosophically opposed to capital 
punishment that virtually no capital appeal will be permitted 
to pass appellate muster,98 while other appellate courts display 
such a hands-off attitude that even egregious errors will not 
constitute cause for reversal.99  Although it is hard to see how 
either the Supreme Court or legislatures can remedy these 
disparities, perhaps a more consistent pattern of results at the 
trial level would result in greater appellate consistency. 
This overview of the legal landscape created by the 
Court’s capital jurisprudence and other systemic factors does 
not give much cause for optimism that the factual evidence will 
show the system to be operating non-arbitrarily.  It is to that 
factual evidence that we now turn our attention. 
II. EVIDENCE OF ARBITRARINESS FROM POPULAR PRESS 
REPORTS 
A. Collecting the Data for 2004 
Perhaps surprisingly, no mechanism exists—either 
governmental or non-governmental—for collecting data on all 
  
IOWA L. REV. 1505, 1513-20 (2002) (detailing extreme variations in state death 
sentence reversal rates, with some states’ rates very high, others very low, and normal 
reversal rates of 30-50%.  For example, Mississippi’s reversal rate of 54.09% and North 
Carolina’s of 53.12% stand in stark contrast to Texas’s 12.95% and Virginia’s 5.17%). 
 98 The Ninth Circuit is notorious for not upholding death sentences.  See 
Diane Gunnels-Rowley, Death Penalty Costs Too Great, 37 ARIZ. ATT’Y 9 (Jan. 2001): 
I am a career prosecutor, but I am personally opposed to the death 
penalty . . . because I believe it is too expensive to administer.  Death penalty 
cases receive the most stringent and far-reaching appellate review, and 
appellate courts (especially the Ninth Circuit) strain at gnats and swallow 
camels seeking reversible error in every death penalty case.  And, of course, 
what they so assiduously seek, they usually find.  This process leads to 
reversals, which leads to costly retrials and often reconvictions. . . .  The 
entire death penalty process consumes valuable judicial resources that, in my 
opinion, would be better spent in making the entire criminal justice process 
more efficient.  
Id. 
 99 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is most often mentioned.  See, e.g., 
Andrew Hammell, Effective Performance Guarantees for Capital State Post-Conviction 
Counsel: Cutting the Gordian Knot, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 347, 375 (2003) (“News 
coverage of problems with capital habeas review in Texas . . . resulted in a torrent of 
criticism of the Court of Criminal Appeals. . . . The Texas Lawyer published a lengthy 
article detailing allegations of the Court of Criminal Appeals’s lax oversight of the list 
of qualified habeas counsel.”); Adam Liptak & Ralph Blumenthal, Death Sentences in 
Texas Cases Try Supreme Court’s Patience, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2004, at A1 (explaining 
the U. S. Supreme Court’s battles to force the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to be 
more receptive to claims of error in capital cases). 
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death-eligible murders in the United States.  To gain a 
nationwide perspective on the operation of capital punishment, 
one must piece together data from many sources.  Set forth 
below are the steps undertaken to compile as complete a 
database as possible of death-eligible offenses with a sentence 
outcome in 2004.  Ultimately, primary reliance was placed on 
news reports appearing in searchable online databases.   
To begin, from the invaluable quarterly report “Death 
Row USA” published by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, one 
can identify with complete accuracy the defendants who were 
sentenced to death in 2004.100  The “Death Row USA” reports 
cover calendar-quarters of the year and are published two to 
three months after that quarter has closed.  These reports do 
not explicitly attempt to identify defendants who have been 
newly added to death row.  To generate such a list one must 
painstakingly compare the list from one quarter to the list from 
the next quarter to see which of the approximately 3400 names 
are new entries.101  The research for this Article compared the 
last quarter 2003 report with the first quarter 2004, the first 
quarter 2004 with the second quarter 2004, the second quarter 
2004 with the third quarter 2004, and the third quarter 2004 
with the fourth quarter 2004.  These comparisons revealed 142 
defendants who were sentenced to death in calendar year 2004.  
The figures throughout the rest of the Article are based on 140 
death-sentenced defendants, rather than the correct total of 142, 
and a total of 583 cases rather than 585, because just as this 
Article was going to press the author found two defendants he 
missed in the initial “Death Row USA” comparisons.  The 
inclusion of these two defendants would have no significant 
effect on the Article's analyses.  More information about these 
two defendants are included at the end of Appendix D.  Of the 
140 death-sentenced defendants, 126 were first-time death 
sentences and fourteen were resentences after appellate 
  
 100 See http://www.naacpldf.org (follow “Publications” hyperlink; then follow 
“Death Row USA” hyperlink). 
 101 There are actually three tasks.  One is to identify names making their first 
appearance from one report to the next—those who are death-sentenced for the first 
time.  The second is to identify which names have become “unbracketed” from one 
report to the next—a name in brackets indicates a death-sentenced inmate whose 
sentence has been overturned and further legal action is pending, so a name becoming 
unbracketed means the death sentence has again been imposed.  The third task is to 
track down each unbracketed name to see whether it is unbracketed because the 
defendant was resentenced to death at the trial level (in which case it should be 
included in our database), or whether an overturned death sentence was reinstated by 
an appellate court (not to be included in our database).  
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reversals.  Early in 2005, however, the Supreme Court ruled 
the death penalty unconstitutional for offenders who were less 
than eighteen years of age at the time of the murder.102  There 
were two death sentences of seventeen-year-olds in 2004.103 
These defendants were left in the database because they 
indicate how the capital punishment system was working at 
the time the sentences were imposed.  The two death sentences 
that will be reversed are simply the first of many of these 
sentences that will ultimately not withstand appellate review. 
The next step after finding the names of the death-
sentenced defendants was to search on the Web for details 
about each defendant.  Factual information was found for 
about 80% percent of the defendants through newspaper 
databases on Westlaw and Lexis.  For the remaining cases 
general Web searches were undertaken.  These occasionally 
yielded no results—for those few cases facts were developed 
through telephone calls to prosecutors, defense lawyers, or 
newspaper reporters.104 
Two other sets of defendants needed to be examined to 
be compared with the death sentence cases: those whose 
sentencer (usually a jury) spared them from death, and those 
who were spared from death by prosecutorial decisions not to 
seek or to bargain away the death penalty.  There is nothing in 
existence like “Death Row USA” to collect these two sets of 
cases.  The recent burgeoning of searchable online databases of 
newspapers, however, combined with the fact that death-
eligible cases are highly newsworthy, enabled compilation of 
large numbers of cases in both these sets (although compiling 
such sets of cases is a laborious, time-consuming task).  Date 
restricted searches of “death /s sentence” and a couple of more 
specific searches105 identified 120 defendants in 2004 who were 
  
 102 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
 103 See App. D, DS 57, 134.  The database searches also revealed three 
seventeen-year-olds who were spared by sentencers, see App. E, SS 50, 68, 117, and six 
sixteen or seventeen-year-olds who were spared by prosecutors.  See App. F, PS 2, 96, 
111, 239, 258, 311.  See also David McCord, Uncondensed Appendices to Lightning Still 
Strikes, (Feb. 26, 2006) (on file with author), available at http://facstaff.law.drake.edu/ 
david.mccord/brooklynAppendices.pdf [hereinafter Uncondensed Appendices]. 
 104 See Uncondensed Appendices, supra note 103, at App. D, DS 48, 21, 63, 91, 
79, 81, 85, 132, 135, 140.  
 105 I also used “death /s sentence /s jury /s spared” and “death /s sentence /s 
plea /s avoid.”  These searches generated only a few additional cases.  Of course, the 
simple “death /s sentence” generated an enormous number of irrelevant hits, but 
experimentation showed that any more restrictive search excluded too many relevant 
articles. 
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spared a death sentence by a sentencer, and 323 defendants 
who were spared from death sentences by prosecutors.  The 
three sets of defendants will be referred to as “Death-
Sentenced” defendants (numbered with the prefix “DS” in 
Appendix D), “Sentencer-Spared” defendants (numbered with 
the prefix “SS” in Appendix E), and “Prosecutor-Spared” 
defendants (numbered with the prefix “PS” in Appendix F). 
B. The Strengths and Weaknesses of the News Reports as 
Research Tools 
Using news reports as the primary data source to 
analyze the death penalty system is not the traditional 
research approach.  The traditional technique, pioneered by 
Professor David Baldus and his colleagues, is to choose a 
discrete time period in the past in a particular jurisdiction, 
identify as many homicides as possible during that period, 
develop rubrics for coding the pertinent facts, train researchers 
(often law students) to recognize those facts, and then send 
those researchers to mine the court files and other available 
documentation (including news reports) to complete the 
rubrics.  Once the data is mined, statistician members of the 
team apply their methods (often some form of multiple 
regression analysis) to attempt to determine what facts seem to 
have important effects on the outcomes of the cases.106   
The “Baldus technique” generates wonderfully rich and 
complete data, and well-supported and illuminating results.  
The news report approach used in this Article is not an 
equivalent of the Baldus technique.  The Baldus technique 
does, though, have three drawbacks.  First, it is quite labor-
intensive and expensive, even when limited to a particular time 
frame in a specific jurisdiction, and thus has never been 
attempted on a nationwide basis.  By contrast, a news report 
  
 106 The most famous study, by Professor Baldus and his colleagues, concerned 
about 1,000 homicides in Georgia over a seven-year period in the 1970’s.  See DAVID C. 
BALDUS ET AL., CHARGING AND SENTENCING OF MURDER AND VOLUNTARY 
MANSLAUGHTER CASES IN GEORGIA, 1973-1979 (1981), available at 
http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/NACJD-STUDY/09264.xml.  This study is 
famous because it underlay the nearly-successful challenge to capital punishment on 
the basis of racial discrimination in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), which 
held in a five to four decision that statistical evidence of racial discrimination is 
insufficient to demonstrate an unconstitutionally racially-motivated death sentence in 
a particular case.  For another example of the Baldus technique, see Baldus, et al., 
Racial Discrimination, supra note 8, at 1662-1710, which describes the methodology 
and analysis of 524 death-eligible cases in Philadelphia from three time periods—1983-
85, 1986-89, and 1990-93—for racial effects. 
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approach is relatively inexpensive and can attain a nationwide 
overview, albeit with much less detail and completeness.  
Second, the Baldus technique’s thoroughness means that by 
the time its results are compiled and analyzed, they are at 
least a couple of years old.  By contrast, the approach in this 
Article enables study of a very recent set of cases.  The third 
drawback of the Baldus technique is that the statistical 
analysis, while very illuminating, is also quite difficult for the 
non-statistically-inclined to understand.  By contrast, this 
Article uses simple arithmetic to compile its results and is 
therefore in some ways more accessible.  Thus, while the 
Baldus technique constitutes state-of-the-art research, it is 
hoped that this Article’s approach provides a different and 
valuable perspective. 
This Article’s approach will be useful, though, only to 
the extent it is based on reliable data.  Three questions must be 
asked: 1) Which defendants are present in, and missing from, 
the three sets? 2) How complete is the information that can be 
gleaned from the news reports about the defendants that were 
found? 3) How confident should we be that the facts were 
correctly reported? 
As to which defendants are included, the three sets of 
cases are asymmetric: every single Death-Sentenced defendant 
is included because of their availability through the “Death 
Row USA” reports, but defendants in Sentencer-Spared and 
Prosecutor-Spared sets were only found if intensive online 
searching turned up at least one news report relating to their 
cases.  While an estimate can be assayed concerning the 
minimum number of defendants missing from the Sentencer-
Spared and Prosecutor-Spared sets,107 the missing defendants 
  
 107 It is possible to do a very rough calculation of the percentage of murder 
convictions in death penalty states that is represented by this Article’s sample of 583 
defendants.  As of the most recent year for which data is available—2002—the Bureau 
of Justice Statistics estimated there were 8,990 murder and non-negligent 
manslaughter convictions nationwide.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. 
STATISTICS, STATE COURT SENTENCING OF CONVICTED FELONS 2002 tbl.4.1 (2005), 
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/scscf02.pdf.  Let’s assume that figure 
held about steady for 2004.  Next, according to the most recent census—2004—about 
13% of the U.S. population resides in non-death-penalty states.  See U.S. DEP’T OF 
COM., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATE AND COUNTY QUICK FACTS, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).  The 
estimated population of the United States was 293,655,404 as of July 1, 2004.  
Approximately 38,175,203, or about 13%, resided in the twelve non-death penalty 
states:  Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North 
Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.  Let’s assume that 
percentage held about steady also.  Finally, let’s assume that the percentage of murder 
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are problematic because they derogate from the ideal condition 
of a complete database of all death-eligible defendants whose 
cases were resolved in 2004.  The silver lining in this cloud, 
however, is that the missing defendants could only strengthen 
the Article’s case for arbitrariness: additional Sentencer-
Spared and Prosecutor-Spared defendants would decrease the 
robustness of the death-sentencing rate, perhaps dramatically.  
Second, how completely are the facts of each case 
reported?  The most complete reporting is of factors that make 
the defendant more blameworthy—what this Article will later 
describe as “depravity points.”  Since it is primarily these 
factors that make the cases newsworthy to begin with, 
reporters are quite good about highlighting them.  Reporters 
focus on mitigating factors less often.  One reason may be that 
those factors are deemed to be of less interest to the public.  
Another reason is that in the Prosecutor-Spared set of 
defendants, often the mitigating factors are unknown because 
the penalty phase was not litigated.  Nonetheless, there is 
sufficient reporting of mitigating factors to derive very definite 
patterns.108 
Third, how confident should we be that the reporters 
correctly reported the information?  This Article relies on 
media self-policing—presumably reporters who get things 
wrong consistently will not be reporting long enough to bias the 
sample.  Internal checks also help validate the reporting of the 
facts, because almost every defendant generated multiple news 
articles, and it was rare to find discrepancies among the facts 
reported in the different articles.  
Thus, while recognizing that the sample of cases is 
imperfect, this Article will proceed on the premise that the data 
are qualitatively and quantitatively sufficient to permit 
comparison between the set of defendants who received death 
sentences, and the sets of those who were eligible to, but did 
not.  Whatever the flaws in these data, they are certainly 
  
convictions in non-death-penalty states was equal to their population percentage, that 
is, 13%.  We can then subtract 13% of 8,990 (1,169) to arrive at a guess that there were 
about 7,821 murder and non-negligent manslaughter convictions in death penalty 
states in 2004.  Thus, this article’s sample of 583 equals about 7.5% of those 7,821 
convictions.  What lurks within the missing 92% or so is of great interest.  What does 
not lurk are death-sentenced defendants, because they are all accounted for through 
the “Death Row USA” reports. 
 108 See infra notes 126-30 and accompanying text. 
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better than anything on which the Court relied in Furman.109  
The Furman majority’s conclusion of arbitrariness could be 
more accurately described as impressionistic than empirical.  
Finally, at a bare minimum, the news reports contain several 
odd, startling, and remarkable moments, ten of which are set 
forth in Appendix H.  
C. Overview of the Three Sets of Defendants  
Jurisdictions: The number of defendants in each of the 
three sets is detailed by jurisdiction in Appendix A.  The 
jurisdictions with the most total defendants from all three sets 
are not surprising—they are several of the populous and active 
(at least in terms of litigating death-sentencings, although not 
necessarily in terms of carrying them out) death penalty 
jurisdictions: Texas (72),110 Florida (54), California (38), 
Pennsylvania (38), North Carolina (31), Ohio (31), and the 
federal government (29).  The next tier down in terms of 
activity is comprised of Louisiana (21), Oklahoma (20), and 
Virginia (20) and Illinois (19). 
Years of the crimes: Appendix B sets forth the years of 
the crimes for which the defendants were being prosecuted.  A 
relatively small number of the crimes date from before 1995, 
and several of those that do, date back to the 1970’s and 1980’s.  
Most of the pre-1995 crimes involved resentencings after 
appellate reversals (sometimes more than one in a case), 
although a smattering were newly solved due to DNA 
technology.  A fair number of crimes occurred between 1995 
and 1999.  These also often involved resentencings or newly 
solved cases, although a couple experienced long delays in the 
original proceeding due to legal maneuvering.  The bulk of the 
  
 109 The members of the majority relied primarily on their personal experiences 
in dealing with death cases while on the Court, most explicitly in Justice White’s 
reliance on his “10 years of almost daily exposure to the facts and circumstances of 
hundreds and hundreds of federal and state criminal cases involving crimes for which 
death is the authorized penalty.”  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, 
J., concurring).  The opinions are conspicuously lacking any empirical analysis, or any 
citation of empirical research, except for raw figures on numbers of death sentences in 
various years, and some additional raw figures about racial distribution of death 
sentences. 
 110 Contrary to popular belief, however, Texas is not the most gung-ho state 
for the death penalty.  See Maro Robbins, Texas Not Really Executioners’ Mecca, SAN 
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Mar. 13, 2004, at 1A (citing statistics showing that Texas 
imposed death sentences at a rate just below the national average, and that while 
Texas is swifter than most states in carrying out death sentences, it is not the swiftest; 
there is, though, great variation among Texas’s 254 counties). 
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crimes—76% of Death-Sentenced defendants, 78% of Sentence-
Spared defendants, and 85% of Prosecutor-Spared 
defendants—were recent, that is, from the four-year period 
between 2000 and 2004.   
Ages of defendants: The ages of defendants within a year 
of the times of the crimes are set forth in Appendix C.111 In 
creating the age categories, those categories toward the low end 
of the age range were formulated to encompass fewer years (16-
17, 18-19, and 20-21) than the ones toward the higher end of 
the range (22-25, 26-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60+).  This 
method was based on the theory that youthful age can count as 
a mitigating factor, but that any age above twenty-one is 
unlikely to be considered particularly mitigating by a 
sentencer.  The primary conclusion that can be drawn from 
Appendix C is that the proportion of defendants in each age 
group does not vary significantly among the Death-Sentenced, 
Sentencer-Spared, and Prosecutor-Spared groups.  Of the 547 
defendants whose ages were revealed by the news reports, 517 
were between eighteen and forty-nine years of age.  Only 
eleven defendants were sixteen to seventeen years of age (and 
they would not even be eligible for death sentences as of March 
2005).112  On the other end of the spectrum, only four 
defendants were sixty or older, and only fifteen were between 
fifty and fifty-nine years of age.  While the death sentence rates 
do not progress in linear fashion, there is an overall trend of 
slightly higher rates with increasing age after age twenty-nine, 
presumably because sentencers believe that the older a person 
becomes, the more likely they are to know better than to 
murder someone.  The only seeming anomaly is that while one 
might expect the death-sentencing rate to be less in the 
eighteen to nineteen age group than in the older age groups, 
sentencers levied death sentences in the eighteen to nineteen 
age group at a higher rate than in the twenty to twenty-one 
and twenty-six to twenty-nine age groups. 
  
 
111 Sometimes a defendant’s age at the time of the crime is clear because a 
news report contemporaneous with the crime gives the defendant’s name.  For many 
defendants, though, the news articles date from a later year after the case has 
progressed through the system.  For these defendants, the news reports commonly give 
the defendant’s age at the time the article is written.  Thus, for example, if the crime 
was committed in 2001, and the news report comes from 2002 and gives the 
defendant’s age as twenty-two at that time, the defendant might have been twenty-one 
at the time of the crime, or, depending on his birthday, might have been twenty-two. 
 112 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005) (holding persons who 
were under age eighteen at the time of commission of an otherwise death-eligible crime 
are ineligible to receive a death sentence due to youthful age). 
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Appendices B and C demonstrate that the Death-
Sentenced, Sentencer-Spared, and Prosecutor-Spared sets of 
defendants are suitable for direct comparison: there are 
sufficient numbers of each, and the sets are not skewed 
relevant to when the crimes were committed or the ages at 
which defendants committed them.  
D. The Depravity Point Calculator:  A Method for Determining 
the “Worst” Murderers  
There are two steps in determining the “worst of the 
worst” murderers.  The first step is to determine which 
murderers are the “worst” based on aggravation level.  The 
second step asks whether, considering the mitigating evidence, 
these “worst” murderers seem like the “worst of the worst.”  
The purpose of this sub-part is to explain the Depravity Point 
Calculator—a method used for performing the first step of the 
analysis, that is, for determining the “worst” murderers in 
terms of aggravation.113  
The Depravity Point Calculator is a means for 
comparing the aggravation levels of defendants.114  The 
Depravity Point Calculator has two aspects.  First, it lists most 
of the factors that can make a case more aggravated.  These 
factors were generated by reading hundreds of news reports, on 
the theory that reporters have a good idea of what matters to 
the public.  Most of the factors are based on common sense, and 
many track the aggravating circumstances in death penalty 
statutes.115 The second aspect of the Depravity Point Calculator 
is that it assigns a weight to each factor; it may assign a weight 
of ‘3’ (most aggravating), ‘2’ (next-most aggravating), or ‘1’ 
(least aggravating).116  This section lists each aggravating 
factor, categorized by weight.  
  
 113 Consideration of the effects of mitigation evidence will be undertaken later.  
See infra notes 126-30 and accompanying text. 
 114 I make no claim that this system always comes up with precisely the right 
rank order of cases.  Many other, and possibly better, systems could be conceived.  I do 
believe, though, that any rational system of ranking the aggravation level of the cases 
would come out with results that do not differ much. 
 115  See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 1999 & Supp. 2005); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-5-202 (West 2005). 
 116 The Depravity Point Calculator 3-weight factors closely track the analysis 
of factors that could increase the likelihood of a death sentence, as identified in a study 
by noted researchers examining a large sample of Georgia homicides a couple of 
decades ago.  See David C. Baldus, et al., Law and Statistics in Conflict: Reflections on 
McCleskey v. Kemp, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 251 (D. K. Kagehiro & 
W.S. Laufer eds., 1992).  Seven of the nine most aggravating factors found in that 
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3-weight factors.  These nine factors are the most aggravating; 
indeed, the presence of any one of them is sufficient to put a 
defendant within the category of the “worst” murderers: 
  Additional murder.  Since every death-eligible case 
involves at least one murder, the first murder is a given and 
does not add depravity points—thus, only a multiple 
murderer would accrue depravity points on this factor.  But, 
as is true with most of the factors, a defendant can accrue 
the factor more than once; for example, a triple murderer 
would accrue this factor once for each additional murder 
beyond the first (2 additional murders times 3 depravity 
points, for a total of 6 depravity points).  Further, murder of 
a visibly pregnant woman (or one known by the defendant 
to be pregnant even though the pregnancy is not visible) 
counts as an additional murder for the killing of the fetus. 
  Sexual assault.  
  Avenge official acts.  The murder was committed to 
avenge the actions of a governmental official, like a judge, 
prosecutor, or police officer.  This does not include a spur-of-
the-moment killing of a police officer, which is a 2-weight 
factor.  The “avenge official acts” factor was rare in 2004, 
present in only one case.117  
  Insurance, etc. motive.  The murder was committed 
with great premeditation for crassly pecuniary reasons.  
(This does not include murder committed during an armed 
robbery, which is a 2-weight factor.) 
  Torture.  The victim was subjected to prolonged physical 
torture before death.  (Relatively short suffering, no matter 
how appalling the defendant’s actions, does not qualify; 
instead, it would qualify for one of the 2-weight factors.) 
  Prisoner/escapee.  The defendant was a prisoner or 
escapee at the time of the murder, which strongly indicates 
that the defendant needs to be wholly incapacitated through 
death so that he cannot kill again while imprisoned or after 
an escape. 
  Incarceration violence.  While imprisoned the 
defendant committed serious acts of violence against 
correctional officers or other inmates.  Again, the 
incapacitation argument is obvious. 
  
study comprise seven of the nine of the Depravity Point Calculator 3-weight factors:  
avenge official acts; torture (physical); insurance, etc. motive; sexual assault; additional 
murder; prisoner/escapee; and murder for hire.  Id. at 260.  I excluded “mental torture 
involved” as being too nebulous, and included incarceration violence and terrorist 
motive.  Admittedly, limiting the aggravation weight to three levels is simplistic, but 
some concessions had to be made for ease of use.   
 117 See Jovan House (SS 96, App. E) and Raymond Saunders (PS 188, App. F).  
These culprits and a cohort ambushed a Baltimore police detective as revenge for 
testimony the detective had given against Saunders’s half brother. 
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  Murder for hire.  Like the “Insurance, etc. motive,” this 
shows great deliberation, and a crassly pecuniary way of 
thinking about the value of human life. 
  Terrorist motive.  Murder was committed to make a 
political statement. 
2-weight factors.  These twenty-five factors are very serious:   
  Attempted murder.  
  Robbery.  This is a very frequently occurring factor, and 
some argue that it results in a great deal of over-
inclusion.118  Robbery, however, is an extremely serious 
contemporaneous felony, and cannot be ignored—indeed, it 
correctly matters greatly to both prosecutors and 
sentencers.119  Although an armed robbery where the victim 
is killed should not in-and-of-itself qualify for death-
eligibility, there are plenty of robber-murderers who are 
among the worst criminals because they accrue additional 
depravity points for other factors.  There is one limiting 
principle—no matter how many robberies a defendant 
committed, he could accrue this factor a maximum of two 
times.  This was necessary because as to a very few 
defendants who committed numerous robberies in which the 
victims were not physically injured, counting 2 depravity 
points for each robbery seemed to overstate their relative 
culpability.  
  Kidnapping.  
  Arson.  
  Serious assault.  This is something short of attempted 
murder, but still showing a great propensity for violence.  
This factor appears most often in aggravated domestic 
violence cases. 
  Escape or escape attempt.  A prior escape, or escape 
attempt by a defendant shows a possible need for the 
ultimate in incapacitation.  (If the defendant committed a 
  
 118 Even one of the few academics to strongly support capital punishment, 
Professor Robert Blecker, has said, “But, the majority of people on death row are 
robber-murderers, who did not commit the kind of killings that qualify them as ‘the 
worst of the worst.’”  Symposium, supra note 13, at 176.  I have not checked Professor 
Blecker’s assertion that the “majority” of death row inmates are robber-murderers, nor 
his implication that they are robber-murderers without any additional aggravating 
factors.  In fact, I doubt that either assertion is empirically correct.  For example, of the 
140 defendants sentenced to death in 2004, slightly less than half of them (sixty-eight) 
had robbery as part of the reason they were sentenced to death (for most, the robbery 
conviction was one of the reasons for a death sentence).  Further, for many of the sixty-
eight, there were additional aggravating factors beyond the robbery. 
 119 Thus Recommendation 28 of the Illinois Commission on Capital 
Punishment, Report of the Governor’s Commission on Capital Punishment (2002), 
available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission_report/ 
complete_report.pdf, arguing for not counting contemporaneous felonies (including 
robbery) to make murderers death-eligible is completely contrary to justice and 
common sense. 
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murder while an escapee, this would not be counted here, 
but as a 3-weight factor). 
  Gang involvement or drug dealing.  This refers either 
to serious gang involvement, or major drug dealing.  These 
activities often overlap; to avoid over-counting, a defendant 
involved in gang-related drug dealing only accrues these 
depravity points once. 
  Other substantial record.  A criminal record indicating 
long-running antisocial behavior (but not including any of 
the other crimes already listed—sexual assault, attempted 
murder, robbery, kidnapping, arson, or serious assault—
which would be counted in those categories). 
  Police officer victim.  Police and prosecutors seem to 
view this as one of the worst factors and would surely argue 
that it should be classified as a 3-weight factor.  But 
considered dispassionately, killing an officer, which usually 
occurs spontaneously, does not seem to be a sine qua non of 
the worst criminals.  In any event, many killers of police 
officers accrue depravity points in other ways that clearly 
put them among the worst criminals. 
  Victim 12 or younger.  Our hearts go out to victims who 
seem less able to protect themselves; the image of the 
promise of a young life cut short haunts us.  A murderer 
who kills a child seems particularly heartless. 
  Multiple stab/bludgeon.  This factor, and the remaining 
2-weight factors, all involve particularly gruesome ways of 
committing the murder, or acts evidencing particularly evil 
mind-sets.  Multiple stabbing or bludgeoning illustrates a 
great capacity for violence. 
  Poisoning/starvation.  This is indicative of great 
premeditation.  
  Strangulation, etc.  There are several means of killing 
that involve disabling the respiratory system: strangulation, 
suffocation, cutting the throat, and drowning.  These all 
inflict severe suffering on the victim, and indicate 
premeditation on the part of the killer. 
  Burning to death.  Causing death by burns or by smoke 
inhalation obviously involves severe pain to the victim and 
premeditation by the killer. 
  Execution-style/rifle/shotgun.  This includes infliction 
of a wound to the head at close range when the victim is at 
the defendant’s mercy.  This also includes any murder 
committed with a rifle or shotgun, which requires more 
planning than handgun murders. 
  Three or more shots with a handgun.  This is 
indicative of a serious bent toward violence. 
  Multiple violence.  This refers to situations in which the 
victim was subjected to more than one type of physical 
injury by the killer.  This is a fallback category—if the 
multiple forms of violence are any of the ones listed above, 
they would be included there.  Thus, this category consists 
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mostly of cases where the killer beat the victim, but not in a 
way that is severe enough to be multiple bludgeoning to 
cause death, and then killed the victim by another means.  
Multiple forms of violence indicate a particular propensity 
for violence. 
  Victim bound.  The killer bound the victim before the 
murder, thus indicating that the victim is particularly 
vulnerable, and the crime particularly premeditated. 
  Victim begged.  There is evidence that the victim begged 
for life, thus indicating the defendant’s premeditation and 
callousness in killing the victim anyway.  
  In presence of child.  Killing the victim in the presence 
of a child is heinous because of the trauma inflicted on the 
child, particularly when—as is true in many cases—when 
the victim is the child’s relative.120   
  In the presence of a parent.  Killing a minor child in 
front of the child’s parent is very depraved.121   
  Hate crime.  Murder of a victim for reasons of race, 
ethnicity, religious belief, or sexual orientation shows a 
particularly warped mind. 
  Violated court order.  This factor arises in domestic 
violence situations where a woman has obtained a 
protective order against a man, but he violates it and kills 
her.  Such a killer exhibits particular contempt for the rule 
of law. 
  Relish killing.  This refers to actions before or during the 
murder indicating that the defendant enjoyed the killing.122 
  Mutilate corpse.  Dismembering a corpse, carving words 
into it, burning it, or the like, illustrates a particularly evil 
state of mind. 
1-weight factors.  These eight factors are heinous, but not to the 
degree of the 2 and 3-weight factors: 
  Home burglary.  This is a particularly frightening factor, 
and would warrant a 2-weighting except for the fact that 
  
 120 The defendant does not accrue these depravity points if he also kills the 
child, but, of course, he would then accrue other depravity points for multiple victims 
and for a child aged 12 or younger. 
 121 If the parent is also killed, these depravity points are not accrued, but 
rather the defendant accrues depravity points for an additional murder. 
 122 See DS 37 (App. D) (defendant wrote on wall of murder scene in lipstick:  
“Killing is my business now”); DS 43 (App. D) (defendant, a prisoner, wrote in letter 
before murder of another inmate that he was waiting for cops to “mess up” and leave 
him around another inmate “so I can test my hand”); DS 70 (App. D) (defendant, who 
knew victim was celebrating birthday, yelled “Happy birthday!” as he stabbed victim 
thirteen times in neck in parking lot); DS 119 (App. D) (defendant shot and killed one 
victim and taunted second victim between gunshots); PS 9 (App. F) (defendant chose to 
kill eight-month pregnant woman by stabbing her rather than shooting her so she 
would suffer more); PS 61 (App. F) (defendant forced victim to strip and walk into 
grave before he shot her, boasting afterward about watching her head explode). 
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invariably a defendant who commits a home-invasion 
burglary does so to commit one of the crimes that is a 3-
weight (sexual assault) or 2-weight (most often robbery) 
factor.  As a result, counting the home invasion as a 
separate 2-weight factor would be over-counting. 
  Luring victim.  For a defendant to lure the victim to the 
site of the murder indicates premeditation. 
  Grave risk to others.  This factor is narrowly construed 
to limit it to use of an assault rifle in a public locale 
outdoors, use of an explosive device, or firing multiple shots 
indoors in a crowded room. 
  Callous attitude after.  Actions such as eating the 
victim’s food after the murder, watching television in the 
room with the victim’s body, and the like, indicate that the 
defendant is so heartless that the murder seems like a 
relatively normal life event to him. 
  Victim complied with robbery.  This refers to 
instances of robbery in which the victim complied with the 
robbery demand, or was shot before the victim was even 
given a chance to comply.  Such behavior indicates the 
defendant’s hardness of heart in killing the victim when the 
murder was unnecessary to accomplish the underlying 
felony. 
  Victim 70 or older/frail.  Elderly victims tug at our 
hearts in terms of their relative vulnerability (although less 
so than children because the promise of a long life is less), 
as do disabled victims. 
  Motive eliminate witness.  This factor is narrowly 
construed to limit it to situations where the defendant killed 
to eliminate a witness not contemporaneous with another 
felony.123   
  Dumping/burying body.  These actions, like mutilating 
the corpse (although in a less perverse way) indicate 
callousness of heart. 
A tally sheet of all aggravating factors divided by 
category was used to rate the aggravation level of each case.  
The tally sheet was transformed into individual depravity point 
grids for each defendant by deletion of irrelevant aggravating 
factors.  These grids allowed for the calculation of the depravity 
point totals for each defendant; these are the totals that appear 
in Appendices D, E, and F. 
  
 123 As to contemporaneous killing during felonies like sexual assault, robbery, 
and kidnapping, it can always be argued that the purpose of the murder was to 
eliminate the victim as a witness; however, this aspect of those felonies is already 
factored into the higher weight assigned to them.  There are, however, quite a few 
cases where defendants, with premeditation, set out to eliminate witnesses to crimes in 
the past.  These are separate incidents that should accrue a separate depravity point. 
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The Depravity Point Calculator provides not only a 
means to analyze the relative level of aggravation of murders, 
but also a means of determining which murderers are not 
aggravated enough to be death-worthy.  Clearly, a murderer 
who accrues no depravity points is not among the “worst” 
(which is not to downplay the fact that every murder is 
horrible—but the task here is to determine which murderers 
are the “worst”).  Who, then, are these no-depravity-point, 
“normal” murderers?  Typically, they fall into one of four 
categories:124 they are those who kill an adult in a domestic 
context (usually husband/wife, boyfriend/girlfriend) relatively 
spontaneously; kill an acquaintance during a disagreement, 
often when both parties are intoxicated; kill a relative stranger 
at a bar or nightclub, again often when both parties are 
intoxicated; or kill in a dispute over illegal drugs.  Almost 
invariably these murders are accomplished with one or two 
handgun or knife wounds.  These “normal” murders in fact 
account for the bulk of wrongful homicides, making murders 
that have aggravating factors stand out as being worse than 
normal murders.  
If, however, we are seeking the “worst” murderers, it is 
not sufficient to exclude only murderers who accrue no 
depravity points.  There are also some low-depravity-point 
murderers who are “very bad,” but not among the “worst.”  
Specifically, the intuitive cut-off point for the “worst” seems to 
fall at the level of 6 depravity points, unless a lower-depravity 
point case includes a 3-weight factor.  Put differently, any 
murderer with a 3-weight factor, or any murderer with 6 or 
more depravity points, falls into the “worst” category; any 
murderer with a 1 or 2 depravity point score, or a 3-to-5 score 
that does not include a 3-weight factor, does not.  The reader, of 
course, is free to peruse the online detailed versions of 
Appendices D, E, and F125 and to draw the line elsewhere.  But 
it is hard to dispute that a murderer with any of the 3-weight 
  
 124 See DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE:  A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS 164 (1991) 
(reporter who spent a year with Baltimore homicide detectives comments that there 
are only “rare victims for whom death is not the inevitable consequence of a long-
running domestic feud or a stunted pharmaceutical career”); David McCord, A Year in 
the Life of Death: Murders and Capital Sentences in South Carolina, 1998, 53 S.C. L. 
REV. 249, 271-72 (2002) (finding that of the 153 homicides in South Carolina in 1998 
about which information was available, twenty were spontaneous killings among 
persons with close relationships, twenty-nine were acquaintance disputes, nine arose 
at a bar or nightclub between strangers, and fourteen arose out of drug disputes—for a 
total of 72 of 153). 
 125 See Uncondensed Appendices, supra note 103. 
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factors is among the “worst” in terms of aggravation.  It is also 
hard to see how a murderer with a depravity point total above 
6 would avoid being classified as one of the “worst,” given that 
to attain that status a defendant would have to accrue either 
two 3-weight factors, a 3-weight factor and two other factors, or 
no 3-weight factors but at least three other factors.  On the 
other hand, murderers with 5 or fewer depravity points that do 
not include a 3-weight factor just do not seem to measure up to 
the appellation of the “worst.”  They are very bad criminals, but 
not the “worst” when one sees how many more aggravated 
murders exist. 
Appendix D summarizes, analyzes, and calculates the 
depravity points for each of the 140 Death-Sentenced 
defendants, and arranges the cases in order from most to least 
depraved.  Appendices E and F do the same for the 120 
Sentencer-Spared defendants and the 323 Prosecutor-Spared 
defendants, respectively. 
E. Mitigation and the “Worst of the Worst” 
The first step in determining the “worst of the worst,” as 
we have just seen, is to create a means for identifying the 
“worst” based on aggravation.  We now move to the second 
step—factoring in mitigation to eliminate some defendants 
from the “worst of the worst,” leaving those who truly are the 
“worst of the worst.”  This step of the analysis is much trickier.  
While most people will agree on what factors aggravate a 
murder, and on roughly how much those factors count in 
aggravation, there are bound to be great differences of opinion 
about what factors are mitigating and how much weight to 
accord them.  For example, does the fact that the defendant 
became dangerous due to a traumatic childhood strongly 
mitigate, or does it actually aggravate because it shows a 
future propensity for violence?  Does the fact that the 
defendant was high on illegal drugs at the time of the murder 
mitigate the crime, or have no effect because the defendant 
chose to ingest the substance?  And if a traumatic childhood or 
an illegal high counts as mitigation, how does a sentencer 
balance such a factor against the aggravation, for example, of a 
triple homicide?  These perplexities are so profound that it was 
impossible to devise a “mitigation point” system equivalent to 
the Depravity Point Calculator. 
Despite the inability to quantify mitigation, the news 
reports provide helpful information in figuring out a way to 
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factor in the effects of mitigation.  The reports show three 
things.  First, mitigating evidence predictably falls into one of 
six categories: 1) horrific upbringing, 2) mental problems 
(retardation, insanity, or diagnosable and serious mental 
problems short of insanity), 3) intoxication or an illegal drug 
habit, 4) relative youthful age, 5) higher culpability of another 
culprit in a multiple perpetrator scenario, and 6) positive 
character traits of the defendants.  For each of the 260 Death-
Sentenced and Sentencer-Spared defendants in Appendices D 
and E, the types of mitigation evidence that were offered, as 
gleaned from the news reports, are charted below the depravity 
point grids.  This mitigation evidence offered and noted in the 
news sources was analyzed and can be accessed on the online 
database. 
The second thing the news reports show about 
mitigating evidence is that it sometimes causes sentencers to 
refuse to impose, and prosecutors to forego, seeking a death 
sentence.  Mitigation is surely one of the primary factors that 
decrease the robustness of the death-sentencing rate.126  It is 
important to bear in mind, however, that the effect of 
mitigating evidence in any particular case on either sentencers 
or prosecutors is wholly unpredictable.    
The third thing the news reports show about mitigation 
is not intuitively obvious: the kinds of mitigation evidence are, 
on average, about the same in prevalence and degree anywhere 
along the depravity point scale—the mitigation evidence 
presented by a defendant with a 5 point depravity score is 
likely to be very similar to that presented by a defendant with 
a 30+ point depravity score.  That is because the types of 
mitigation that can be offered fall into the limited number of 
categories listed above, and, as will be discussed below, end up 
sounding quite similar across the range of defendants. 
As to the prevalence of mitigation evidence, Appendix G 
shows a breakdown of the types of mitigation offered in the 
Death-Sentenced and Sentencer-Spared cases (although a fair 
proportion of cases—sixty-seven out of 260—fall into the 
“unknown” mitigation category because reporters are not as 
  
 126 Indeed, one suspects that it is the primary factor for sentencers, since the 
only other possible factors are that the murder is simply not depraved enough 
(unlikely, since almost any aggravated murder seems very depraved to most jurors), or 
that a juror gets cold feet and cannot “pull the trigger” on a death sentence (something 
that probably happens with some regularity).  As to prosecutors, potential mitigation is 
certainly a significant factor in foregoing seeking death sentences, but not the only one, 
and often not the most important one—as we will see later.  See infra pp. 856-864.  
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assiduous in reporting mitigation evidence as in reporting the 
facts of the crimes).  The primary finding is that defense 
lawyers have learned the value of “human frailty” mitigation—
the first four categories listed above (horrific upbringing, 
mental problems, drug habit/intoxication, and youthful age).  
Below is a chart that shows the proportion of cases in each of 
six depravity point ranges in which the defendants offered 
human frailty mitigation, where mitigation was mentioned in 
the news reports: 
 
Depravity Point Level Death-Sentenced Sentencer-Spared 
30+ 7/8 3/4 
20-29 7/7 6/6 
15-19 13/14 5/5 
10-14 23/31 13/14 
7-9 18/21 13/16 
6 or less 14/17 11/15 
 
The rates in each category are very high, and are comparable 
between the Death-Sentenced and Sentencer-Spared 
defendants.  Even in the few cases where human frailty 
evidence was not reported, one or both of the other two types of 
mitigation evidence (not primary culprit, positive character) 
was almost always presented.  In fact, according to the news 
reports, only eight defendants punted on mitigation, either by 
refusing to permit their attorneys to present evidence or 
argument on mitigation, or by trying to undermine the case for 
a non-death sentence by requesting death from the sentencer.127 
As to the degree of the mitigation evidence, there is no 
way to quantify it.  But there is a state-of-the-art method of 
discovering and presenting mitigating evidence that good 
capital defense lawyers have learned that includes extensive 
background research and psychological testing (assuming the 
lawyers are good, and that they have the resources to do the 
investigation).128   
  
 127 See DS 4, 6, 16, 24, 48, 61, 71, and 92 (App. D).  But see SS 45, 37, and 98 
(App. E) (defendants requested a death sentence, but the sentencer declined to impose 
it). 
 128 See John M. Fabian, Death Penalty Mitigation and the Role of the Forensic 
Psychologist, 27 L. & PSYCH. REV. 73 (2003) (explaining psychological mitigation 
opportunities); Daniel L. Payne, Building the Case for Life:  A Mitigation Specialist as 
a Necessity and a Matter of Right, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 43 (2003) (explaining how mitigation 
evidence should be unearthed and presented); David L. Beck, Investigator Digs Deep 
into Minds of Killers: Keeping Clients Off Death Row, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, July 
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Once such investigations are undertaken, they tend to 
turn up an eerily similar pattern for most capital defendants: a 
horribly neglected/abused upbringing that results in mental 
problems that lead to drug and alcohol abuse, and eventually to 
a depraved murder.129  While it is certainly true that there are 
better and worse ways of presenting this evidence, and that 
good lawyering can make a huge difference, the basic core of 
mitigating evidence concerning capital defendants sounds 
about the same, no matter how depraved the crime. 
It bears repeating that mitigation evidence is not 
factored in via the Depravity Point Calculator, and the effect of 
mitigation in any particular case is unpredictable.  Even 
though the effect of mitigation in any particular case is wholly 
unpredictable, the effect over the run of cases in a non-
arbitrary system should be that the death-sentencing rate goes 
up as the depravity point level increases.  On the other hand, if 
the death-sentencing rate does not go up as the depravity point 
level rises, that would be good evidence that the effects of 
mitigation are so unpredictable as to pervade the system with 
arbitrariness (although there would be other culprits for 
arbitrariness, as well).  We will examine whether the death-
sentencing rate increases with depravity level shortly.130   
  
10, 2005, at A6 (explaining the techniques and unlikely successes of mitigation 
specialist Margy Erickson).  Another resource is the annual “Life in the Balance” 
Conference sponsored by the National Legal Aid and Defender Association, one of 
many such capital defense training opportunities.  According to the promotional 
material: 
NLADA’s Life in the Balance conference brings together mitigation 
specialists, defense investigators, and capital defense attorneys from around 
the nation to improve their skills and techniques in all aspects of death 
penalty defense.  Seminars are offered on the latest scientific, medical and 
psychiatric developments in capital cases; on the most recent developments 
in the law; and on a wide range of creative trial strategies and tactics. 
National Legal Aid and Defender Association, http://www.nlada.org/Training/-
Train_Defender/Train_Defender_Balance (last visited Jan. 28, 2006) (emphasis in 
original).  Renowned death penalty lawyer Stephen Bright also commented recently, 
“The quality of defense lawyering is much better.”  Mike Tolson, Fewer Killers Getting 
Sentenced to Death, HOUSTON CHRON., May 22, 2005, at A1.  On the other hand, 
meticulous mitigation is no guarantee of escaping a death sentence.  See, e.g., Richard 
K. DeAtley & Lisa O’Neill Hill, Abuse Defense Often Fails in Murder Cases, PRESS-
ENTERPRISE (Riverside, Cal.), May 17, 2005, at A1 (detailing some abuse claims in 
capital cases in California that have failed over the years).   
 129 See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 130 See infra note 179 and accompanying text. 
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F. Two Crucial Charts 
Charts 1 and 2, below, will be crucial in answering the 
first three sub-questions concerning whether the death penalty 
system is arbitrary.  Chart 1 collects information from the 
Death-Sentenced, Sentencer-Spared, and Prosecutor-Spared 
defendants in Appendices D, E, and F.  The defendants are 
divided into seven depravity point ranges.131  The Chart is 
designed to identify cases that are of roughly equal levels of 
aggravation, in descending order, to enable analysis of the first 
three sub-questions.  Chart 2 collects information on “poster 
boys” for the death penalty to provide an alternative analysis of 
the first three sub-questions. 
Before presenting Chart 1, it will be useful to set forth 
examples of defendants who fall within each of the seven 
ranges.  (Information on all 583 defendants is available 
online.)132 Three examples will be presented from each range, 
one from the Death-Sentenced database, one from the 
Sentencer-Spared database, and one from the Prosecutor-
Spared database.133  Each case will be briefly summarized in 
order to impart a flavor for the kind of defendants who fall into 
each category.134  
The top category is 30+ depravity points, which could be 
considered ridiculously aggravated: 
Death-Sentenced: Andrew Urdiales (DS 1) 
This serial killer shot Cassandra Corum and dumped her body in a 
river.  Urdiales confessed to killing seven other women between 1988 
and 1996, two in the Chicago area and five in California.  These 
murders involved kidnappings and sexual assaults, and death by 
both shooting and stabbing. 
Sentencer-Spared: Terry Nichols (SS 1)  
Nichols helped Timothy McVeigh create the bomb that exploded at 
the Oklahoma City federal building, killing over 160 people.  Nichols 
  
 131 While it is somewhat artificial to lump, for example, a 15-point case with a 
19-point case in terms of aggravation, a chart listing every single point along the 
spectrum would be too cumbersome to be useful.  
 132 See Uncondensed Appendices, supra note 103, at Apps. D-F. 
 133 In each instance, we will use the case with the highest number of depravity 
points that fits within the range; when there are defendants who are tied for the 
highest number of depravity points, we will use the defendant who comes first in 
alphabetical order by surname, which is how the defendants are arranged in 
Appendices D, E, and F. 
 134  For a complete analysis of the depravity points, refer to the full summaries 
online.  Uncondensed Appendices, supra note 103. 
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was convicted of 161 counts of first-degree murder as well as one 
count each of first-degree arson and conspiracy. 
Prosecutor-Spared: Charles Cullen (PS 1)  
He admitted to killing at least thirty-three of his patients by 
injecting them with drugs during his sixteen months as a critical 
care nurse in several hospitals in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. 
In the next-most depraved category, defendants in the 
20-29 range could be called enormously aggravated: 
Death-Sentenced: Douglas Belt (DS 13)  
Belt beheaded Lucille Gallegos at an apartment complex where she 
worked as a housekeeper.  After the murder, Belt set the apartment 
on fire to destroy the evidence of the murder.  DNA evidence also 
tied Belt to six rapes. 
Sentencer-Spared: Ronald Hinton (SS 3)  
A serial killer who burglarized, sexually assaulted, and strangled 
three women in separate attacks. 
Prosecutor-Spared: William Floyd Zamastil (PS 22)  
He picked up two teenage hitchhikers—a brother and sister—then 
bound and bludgeoned them to death.  He pleaded guilty and 
received two sentences of twenty-five to life; he was already serving 
a life sentence in Wisconsin for another murder. 
Further down the scale, defendants in the 15-19 range 
could be termed extremely aggravated: 
Death-Sentenced: Curtis Flowers (DS 29)  
Flowers shot four people to death execution-style during the robbery 
of a store where he used to work.  
Sentencer-Spared: Cody Nielson (SS 12)  
Nielson kidnapped, sexually assaulted, and killed a fifteen-year-old 
girl, dismembered her body and buried it, and months later returned 
to burn what was left of the body. 
Prosecutor-Spared: Michael Bechtel (PS 26)  
Bechtel shot and killed his estranged wife who had a protective order 
against him, as well as their three-year-old son and two of his wife’s 
friends. 
The next step down the depravity point scale 
encompasses defendants in the 10-14 range, who could be 
characterized as highly aggravated: 
Death-Sentenced: Robert Acuna (DS 57)  
He committed a home invasion burglary and robbery of his 
neighbors James Carroll (age seventy-five) and Joyce Carroll (age 
seventy-four), and shot each of them in the head at close range.  He 
was arrested five days later at a motel in possession of their car, 
some jewelry, and the murder weapon.  Several months earlier he 
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had been charged with aggravated assault for pulling a knife on an 
elderly man in a mall parking lot. 
Sentencer-Spared: Coy Evans (SS 23)  
He was convicted of murder, burglary, armed kidnapping, armed 
robbery and fleeing and eluding law enforcement in the shooting 
death of Tallahassee police Sgt. Dale Green.  The officer had arrived 
to help two women who reported a home-invasion robbery.  Evans 
shot Green six times, once in the back of the head. 
Prosecutor-Spared: Richard Dwight Bernard (PS 52)  
He killed three victims.  Police found the body of Tasha Robinson in 
her home.  She had been shot in the head execution-style.  The body 
of Anthony Rankin, Robinson’s boyfriend, was later found in a 
rented van; he had also been shot in the head.  Two weeks later, the 
remains of thirteen-year-old Marquis Anton Jobes were located in a 
field. 
At the next level on the spectrum, defendants in the 7-9 
range could be described as very aggravated: 
Death-Sentenced: Robert Arrington (DS 98)  
He robbed and beat to death his girlfriend, Kathy Hutchens, in her 
home (and also beat her German Shepherd to death).  Arrington had 
served five years in prison for strangling his wife in 1986 after he 
pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter.   
Sentencer-Spared: James Coleman (SS 51)  
Coleman strangled his live-in girlfriend in their apartment, then 
suffocated her ten-week-old baby and put the baby’s body in the 
freezer. 
Prosecutor-Spared: Brian Bahr (PS 111)  
Bahr lured a twelve-year-old girl into the woods where he raped her, 
beat her, and choked her to death, then put her body in a creek. 
Defendants in the 3w-6 range (“3w” denotes those cases 
of 3, 4, and 5 depravity points that include a 3-weight factor 
that makes them death-eligible) could be called moderately 
aggravated: 
Death-Sentenced: Brenda Andrew (DS 124)  
Andrew conspired with her lover to kill her husband for the proceeds 
of an $800,000 insurance policy.  Andrew and the lover ambushed 
her husband with a shotgun in the garage of the Andrew home.  
Andrew then claimed that her husband was the victim of a robbery 
by two masked men. 
Sentencer-Spared: Francisco Cabrialez (SS 80)  
Cabrialez burglarized a home to commit a robbery and killed the 
homeowner in the process.  Cabrialez attacked deputies while in jail 
on two occasions. 
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Prosecutor-Spared: Jonathon Appley (PS 194)  
Appley and a cohort robbed and strangled and beat with a tree 
branch a camper at a lake. 
Defendants in the 2-5 no3w range (“no3w” denotes cases 
that of 3, 4, or 5 depravity points that do not include a 3-weight 
factor) could be called not aggravated enough because they 
should not be death-eligible: 
Death-Sentenced: James Edward Barber (DS 129) 
Barber was a handyman who had been doing work for seventy-five 
year-old Dorothy Epps.  During a robbery, he beat her to death with 
a hammer. 
Sentencer-Spared: Francisco Carrion (SS 94)  
Carrion burglarized the home of an elderly woman and when she 
confronted him with a knife, wrestled it away from her and stabbed 
her to death. 
Prosecutor-Spared: Allan Abruzzino (PS 223)  
Abruzzino and an accomplice invaded the Velazquez home and 
attempted a robbery.  Abruzzino threatened Velazquez’s six-year-old 
daughter with a gun to her throat.  When Velazquez realized it was 
a BB gun, he turned it toward Abruzzino, who in turn pulled out a 
knife and stabbed Velazquez. 
 
After this survey of what defendants at various levels of 
depravity look like, here is crucial Chart 1: 
Chart 1: Death-Sentencing Rates by Depravity Point Level 
Depravity 
Points 
Total 
Defs. DS SS PS 
Sentencer 
Death Rate 
Overall 
Death Rate 
30+ 23 12 2 9 86% 52% 
20-29 41 16 9 16 64% 39% 
15-19 64 28 10 26 74% 44% 
10-14 128 41 29 58 59% 32% 
7-9 139 26 29 84 47% 19% 
3w-6 71 5 17 49 23% 7% 
2-5 no3w 117 12 24 81 33% 10% 
Total 583 140 120 323 54% 24% 
 
 
The “Sentencer Death Rate” calculates the percentage of 
defendants at a given depravity point level who were sentenced 
to death in cases decided by sentencers; the “Overall Death 
Rate” calculates the percentage of defendants at a given 
depravity point level who were sentenced to death out of all 
death-eligible defendants identified, including the Prosecutor-
Spared defendants.  The Chart is crucial because it allows 
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analysis of the first three of the four sub-questions of 
arbitrariness. 
G. Answering the Four Sub-Questions of Arbitrariness 
1. Does the System Exclude All Those Who Are Not the 
“Worst of the Worst” from Death Sentences? 
The system does exclude almost all those who are not 
the “worst of the worst” from death sentences.  The bottom 
number (the defendants with depravity point totals between 2 
and 5 without any 3-weight factors) in the Death-Sentenced 
category, however, shows that there were twelve defendants 
sentenced to death who were not aggravated enough to deserve 
it according to the Depravity Point Calculator:135 six robbers 
who killed, without much further depravity;136 two defendants 
who spontaneously killed a police officer, without much further 
depravity;137 two who killed out of jealousy, without much 
further depravity;138 and two who killed out of gang motives, 
without much further depravity.139  If the news reports included 
all the depravity point factors, then these defendants, while 
deserving very severe punishment, were not among the “worst” 
murderers.  It is possible, of course, that more intensive mining 
of the case files of these defendants would turn up additional 
depravity points not reported in the media that would be 
sufficient to boost these defendants over the threshold of death-
worthiness. 
If no additional depravity points exist, however, these 
twelve represent slightly less than 10% of the 140 Death-
Sentenced defendants.  This is not a high percentage, but 
neither is it negligible—particularly to those twelve 
defendants.  This percentage would be especially discouraging 
because it would further support the conclusion that the Court 
  
 135 Actually, these defendants were not even among the “worst” murderers, 
even without considering mitigating factors that may have taken them out of the 
“worst of the worst” category.  One of them did have powerful evidence that he was 
deranged, which should have doubly exempted him from death-worthiness.  See App. 
D, DS 135. 
 136 See App. D, DS 128, 129, 130, 133, 134, 136. 
 137 See App. D, DS 135, 140. 
 138 See App. D, DS 132, 137.  
 139 See App. D, DS 131, 138.  
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has failed in its primary goal since Furman of eliminating over-
inclusion.140 
2a. Does the System Sentence a Robust Percentage of 
the “Worst of the Worst” to Death? 
The death sentence rate was 24% among all the 
defendants in the sample (140/583).  That is well below the  
33 1/3% rate this Article uses as a benchmark for robustness.  
Further, at only one depravity point level does the overall 
death rate even reach 50% (30+).  Also, the overall death rate 
within the five highest depravity point categories (7-9 through 
30+) is 31%, under the 33 1/3% benchmark for robustness 
among all death-eligible cases, as is the 27% death rate within 
all the categories the depravity point system rates as 
aggravated enough to be death-worthy (3w-6 through 30+).  
Beyond that, the 24% death-sentencing rate is skewed toward 
the high side because all 2004 death sentences are included, 
while an undetermined number of non-death resolutions in 
death-eligible cases were undoubtedly missed by the database 
searches.141  The addition of these missing defendants would 
only serve to decrease the robustness of the death-sentencing 
ratio, perhaps by many percentage points. 
Yet another fact significantly decreases the effective 
death-sentencing rate: if we were to examine the 140 death 
sentences imposed in 2004 ten years from now, we would 
almost certainly find that at least half of them were reversed 
  
 140 See supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.  
 141 While it is impossible to tell how many such cases are missing, a minimum 
guess can be calculated as follows.  I tried to anticipate the death-sentence cases by 
finding them through database searches for each quarter before the “Death Row USA” 
reports were made public.  For each quarter, the database searches missed about eight 
of the thirty to thirty-five death sentences—roughly 25%.  It is fair to assume that the 
database searches for Sentencer-Spared and Prosecutor-Spared defendants missed at 
least 25% of those cases (and probably more because Death-Sentenced defendants are 
more likely to generate news reports than Sentencer-Spared or Prosecutor-Spared 
defendants).  Using the 25% missing assumption, the searches missed about 111 
Sentencer-Spared or Prosecutor-Spared defendants (25% of the combined total of 443 
Sentencer-Spared and Prosecutor-Spared defendants).  Adding these to the 583 
defendants in the three sets, the death sentence rate falls to 20% (140/694).  Of course, 
the number of cases missing from the Sentencer-Spared and Prosecutor-Spared 
databases could be far greater than these calculations suggest: if the database searches 
missed 92%, see supra note 107, of the murder case resolutions in 2004, and a 
relatively high percentage of murders in many death penalty jurisdictions are death-
eligible, then there could be scores of additional case resolutions that would lower the 
death-sentencing rate dramatically.   
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on appeal and not re-imposed.142  Using a 2004 death-
sentencing rate of 24%, the real death-sentencing rate after the 
dust of reversals has settled years from now is likely to be 
about 12%—below the 15-20% condemned by Furman.  
2b. Another Perspective: “Poster Boy” Death-Sentencing 
Rates 
There is an alternative way of analyzing the robustness 
of the death-sentencing rate.  The alternative focuses on 
specific kinds of defendants who have been suggested as being 
particularly death-worthy—sometimes colloquially referred to 
as “poster boys for the death penalty.”143  A starting point for 
defining “poster boy” categories is a list proposed by Professor 
Baldus: “multiple killings, defendants with prior murder 
convictions, contract killings, police victim cases, extreme 
torture, and sexual assaults with particular violence and 
terror,”144 with some revisions to more fully account for the 
most notorious types of murderers.  Specifically, we will 1) sub-
  
 142 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.  See also THOMAS P. BONCZAR 
AND TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS BULL., CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT, 2003 9 (2004), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp03.pdf (reporting 
that there were ninety-three appellate reversals in capital cases in 2003, the most 
recent year for which data had been collected.  Of these appellate reversals, fifteen 
were reversals of conviction and sentence, and seventy-eight were reversals of sentence 
only.  Most of the conviction reversals (eleven of fifteen) were awaiting retrial, but only 
twelve of the seventy-eight sentence reversals were awaiting resentencing.  This means 
that the other sixty-five cases were not pursued for death sentences again, and those 
defendants, as the Bulletin states, “were serving a reduced sentence,” apparently due 
to plea bargaining.).  Additionally, in the case sample in this Article, of all the scores of 
reversed sentences that must have been ripe for a resentencing proceeding in 2004, 
only sixteen resentencing proceedings were found:  twelve that resulted in new death 
sentences, see App. D, DS 8, 16, 18, 30, 40, 45, 60, 70, 100, 118, 126, 138, and four that 
did not.  See App. E, SS 8, 13, 68, 112.   
 143 See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Another Place Beyond Here:  The Death 
Penalty Moratorium Movement in the United States, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 52 (2002) 
(“Although the overall effect of the McVeigh execution was to create a poster boy for the 
pro-death penalty movement . . . .”); Wayne A. Logan, Casting New Light on an Old 
Subject:  Death Penalty Abolitionism for a New Millennium, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1336, 
1366 (2002) (“McVeigh, like predecessor death penalty ‘poster boys’ Eichman, Dahmer, 
and Gacy, put traditional abolitionists in a difficult spot.”); Brian MacQuarrie, High 
Court Clears the Way for Conn. Execution, B. GLOBE, Jan. 29, 2005, at A1 (“A former 
State Police detective who cracked the case [of serial killer Michael Ross], called Ross a 
‘poster boy for the death penalty.’”); Glen Puit, Killer Requests Death, Gets Life Term 
from Jury, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Mar. 4, 2004, at 1B (“[Defense lawyer] Denue said his 
client [Anthony Prentice, see App. E, SS 45] was ‘the poster boy for the death penalty 
and [the jury] still chose life.’”). 
 144 See Baldus, When Symbols Clash, supra note 13, at 1605. 
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divide multiple murders into a) serial killings,145 b) double 
murders (not serial), and c) three or more murders (not serial); 
2) expand “contract killings” to include all homicides for 
pecuniary gain that evidence long premeditation even if there 
was no hired killer; 3) add the category of killing a victim who 
is twelve years of age or younger; 4) add the category that the 
defendant was a prisoner or escapee at the time of the murder; 
and 5) add the category of terrorist motive.  Do defendants in 
these “poster boy” categories meet even the modest 33 1/3% 
death-sentencing rate?   
What Appendices D, E, and F reveal about these “poster 
boy” categories is set forth in Chart 2 (note that the same case 
can meet the criteria for more than one category): 
Chart 2: Poster Boy Death-Sentencing Rates  
Poster Boy 
Category 
Total 
Defs. DS SS PS 
Sentencer 
Death 
Rate 
Overall 
Death 
Rate 
Serial killer 11 5146 1147 5148 83% 45% 
2 victims 132 44149 31150 57151 59% 33% 
  
 145 There is a “lack of a standard definition of serial murder . . . . In general, 
previous efforts to define serial murder have included criteria relative to the number of 
victims, time elapsed between crimes, motivation, geographical mobility, and victim 
selection.”  FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., F.B.I. LAW 
ENFORCEMENT BULL. 27 (Jan. 2005).  For an extensive discussion of the various 
attempts to define “serial murder,” see Edward W. Mitchell, The Aetiology of Serial 
Murder: Towards an Integrated Model 3-6 (1997) (M.Phil. thesis, U. of Cambridge, 
UK), available at http://users.ox.ac.uk/~zool0380/masters.htm.  I will employ a two-
part, popular-understanding definition:  (a) multiple sexually-motivated murders or 
attempted murders, separated in time, against strangers; and (b) multiple murders, 
separated in time, by a health care worker.  Ten cases fall into the first definition.  See 
App. D, DS 1, 3, 4, 5, 6; App. E, SS 3; App. F, PS 5, 14, 24, 48.  One case falls into the 
second definition.  See App. F, PS 1. 
 146 See App. D, DS 1, 3, 4, 5, 6. 
 147 See App. E, SS 3. 
 148 See App. F, PS 1, 5, 14, 24, 48. 
 149 See App. D, DS 8, 18, 19, 22, 24, 28, 30, 31, 32, 35, 40, 41, 43, 46, 50, 52, 55, 
56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 67, 68, 69, 74, 75, 79, 81, 83, 86, 91, 95, 96, 98, 100, 104, 108, 
112, 115, 119, 138.  
 150 See App. E, SS 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 40, 44, 48, 
49, 51, 54, 55, 58, 59, 60, 68, 75, 76, 77, 78, 84, 88, 102. 
 151 See App. F, PS 13, 14, 20, 27, 28, 29, 40, 41, 42, 43, 48, 51, 53, 57, 59, 68, 
71, 72, 78, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 93, 95, 100, 104, 106, 109, 114, 115, 116, 117, 124, 126, 
127, 164, 168, 171, 172, 189, 190, 207, 237, 244, 245, 251, 252, 257, 258, 259, 260, 263, 
292, 299, 306. 
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3 or more victims 88 26152 15153 47154 63% 30% 
Prior murder 
conv. 
12 8155 3156 1157 73% 67% 
Pecuniary 
premed. 
45 10158 5159 30160 67% 22% 
Police victim 20 6161 5162 9163 55% 30% 
Child victim 81 25164 15165 41166 62% 31% 
Torture 31 11167 5168 15169 69% 35% 
Sexual assault 86 38170 16171 32172 70% 44% 
Prisoner/escapee 10 6173 2174 2175 75% 60% 
Terrorist motive 3 1176 1177 1178 50% 33% 
 
 
Bearing in mind that all these percentages are inflated 
by the non-inclusion of cases missed by the database searches, 
  
 152 See App. D, DS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 21, 26, 29, 33, 36, 37, 
38, 39, 45, 47, 64, 72, 82. 
 153 See App. E, SS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 15, 24, 25, 29, 35. 
 154 See App. F, PS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 
23, 24, 25, 26, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 44, 45, 46, 47, 50, 52, 56, 66, 69, 75, 76, 
80, 98, 101, 148. 
 155 See App. D, DS  36, 46, 58, 63, 67, 72, 98, 112. 
 156 See App. E, SS 2, 55, 76. 
 157 See App. F, PS 59. 
 158 See App. D, DS 10, 31, 50, 64, 76, 78, 89, 106, 124. 
 159 See App. E, SS 44, 62, 64, 86, 109. 
 160 See App. F, PS 16, 17, 19, 31, 46, 47, 51, 53, 62, 67, 70, 73, 74, 82, 83, 84, 
99, 137, 138, 166, 167, 170, 185, 248, 249, 250, 255, 256, 262, 265. 
 161 See App. D, DS 39, 86, 104, 125, 139, 140. 
 162 See App. E, SS 1, 23, 36, 81, 103. 
 163 See App. F, PS 59, 108, 125, 188, 189, 269, 275, 278, 320. 
 164 See App. D, DS 6, 11, 15, 16, 19, 37, 38, 40, 44, 49, 50, 54, 62, 64, 71, 77, 88, 
94, 96, 99, 101, 107, 113, 115, 131. 
 165 See App. E, SS 1, 8, 9, 11, 14, 19, 22, 32, 43, 51, 73, 91, 103, 104, 111. 
 166 See App. F, PS 10, 15, 18, 23, 26, 30, 34, 35, 58, 60, 71, 86, 87, 93, 95, 101, 
104, 111, 131, 141, 142, 143, 180, 208, 216, 219, 221, 231, 233, 237, 267, 268, 272, 273, 
280, 283, 284, 287, 291, 293, 323. 
 167 See App. D, DS 4, 5, 8, 15, 17, 27, 54, 62, 65, 77, 110. 
 168 See App. E, SS 16, 46, 47, 73, 91. 
 169 See App. F, PS 5, 20, 54, 55, 61, 94, 102, 131, 141, 142, 143, 153, 154, 156, 
180. 
 170 See App. D, DS 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 25, 27, 30, 34, 
40, 42, 46, 49, 51, 54, 55, 62, 65, 66, 71, 76, 77, 92, 93, 94, 101, 107, 126. 
 171 See App. E, SS 3, 10, 12, 14, 16, 39, 40, 43, 52, 53, 56, 61, 63, 82, 92, 93. 
 172 See App. F, PS 5, 14, 22, 24, 27, 32, 45, 49, 54, 55, 60, 62, 64, 65, 71, 79, 81, 
94, 111, 118, 136, 156, 157, 161, 187, 201, 210, 216, 231, 236, 238, 264. 
 173 See App. D, DS 20, 22, 36, 43, 58, 63. 
 174 See App. E, SS 17, 29. 
 175 See App. F, PS 59, 100. 
 176 See App. D, DS 2.  
 177 See App. E, SS 1. 
 178 See App. F, PS 2. 
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Chart 2 nonetheless illustrates a robust sentencer death rate of 
at least 33 1/3% in all eleven “poster boy” categories.  The 
overall death rate figures after including Prosecutor-Spared 
defendants, however, are robust in only seven categories; 
further, three of those categories barely achieve robust levels 
(exactly 33 1/3% for “2 victims,” 35% for “Torture,” and exactly 
33 1/3% for “Terrorist motive”).  Two other categories, although 
exhibiting robust death-sentencing rates, are not as high as one 
would expect from “poster boys”:  particularly startling is the 
mere 45% overall death rate for “Serial killers,” the most 
“poster-boyish” of the “poster boys.”  Also remarkable in its 
modest overall death rate is the 44% for “Sexual assault” 
defendants.  And perhaps most surprising are four categories 
that fail to achieve an overall robust death sentencing rate: 
30% for “3 or more victims” (three percentage points lower than 
for “2 victims”), 22% for “Pecuniary premeditation,” and 30% 
for “Police victim.”  Indeed, the only two categories with really 
robust rates are 67% for “Prior murder conviction,” and 60% for 
“Prisoner/escapee” (both of which have a limited number of 
defendants).   
In summary, Chart 1 illustrates that the overall death-
sentencing rate of 24% hardly qualifies as robust among all the 
583 death-eligible defendants; Chart 2 illustrates that this lack 
of robustness is not uncommon even among the intuitively 
most depraved, “poster boy” defendants.   
3. Does the Death-Sentencing Rate Increase with 
Aggravation Level? 
Recall that Chart 1 is as follows: 
Chart 1: Death-Sentencing Rates by Depravity Point Level 
Depravity 
Points 
Total 
Defs. DS SS PS 
Sentencer 
Death Rate 
Overall 
Death Rate 
30+ 23 12 2 9 86% 52% 
20-29 41 16 9 16 64% 39% 
15-19 64 28 10 26 74% 44% 
10-14 128 41 29 58 59% 32% 
7-9 139 26 29 84 47% 19% 
3w-6 71 5 17 49 23% 7% 
2-5 no3w 117 12 24 81 33% 10% 
Total 583 140 120 323 54% 24% 
 
Chart 1 demonstrates that the death-sentencing rate 
does increase overall with aggravation level, but not in an 
entirely linear fashion.  The death-sentencing rates at the two 
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lowest depravity levels are certainly significantly lower than at 
the higher levels.  But the rates at the two lowest levels are 
reversed from what a non-arbitrary system would project: the 
rate with sentencers in the non-death-eligible 2-5no3w category 
is 33%, compared with 23% for death-eligible 3w-6 defendants, 
and the overall rates in those categories are 10% and 7%, 
respectively.  Moving to the higher levels, there is an expected 
progression moving from 7-9 to 10-14 to 15-19: 47% to 59% to 
74% with sentencers, and 19% to 32% to 44% overall.  The 
progression falters, however, at two of the upper levels.  With 
sentencers, the rate in the 20-29 category is 10 percentage 
points less than in the 15-19 category (64% vs. 74%).179  
Arguably, the increase in death-sentencing rate with 
aggravation level is close enough to what rationality would 
suggest that the current system should not be deemed 
arbitrary on this basis alone; but neither does this data present 
a compelling case for non-arbitrariness.   
4. Are the Reasons for Sparing Defendants from Death 
Sentences Merits-Based? 
a. Sentencer Reasons 
There are too few indications in the news reports about 
why sentencers (almost always juries) spared defendants to 
draw any empirical conclusions based on what jurors said after 
the fact.  Jurors mostly remained mum about why they spared 
defendants; and even when the occasional juror gave a reason 
to the press, there is no guarantee that the juror was stating 
  
 179 There is an alternative way to view these statistics that could refute the 
contention that the death-sentencing rate should rise as the depravity point level goes 
up.  It could be argued that the figures show that juries “max out” in their feelings 
about how depraved a defendant is at about depravity point level 7; that is, that a 
defendant with a depravity point level of 7 already seems to jurors to be so bad that 
they are simply unable to feel that a higher level of depravity points makes a defendant 
significantly more death-worthy.  If we imagine a ten-point scale of death-worthiness, 
with 10 as highest, then a 7-depravity-point defendant rates about a 9.5 for most 
jurors, leaving little room for increasing levels of death-sentencing as the depravity 
point level goes up even further.  But even if this is true, it has only marginal effects in 
making the figures in Chart 1 seem less arbitrary:  the “Overall death rate” among the 
390 defendants with 7 or more depravity points is 36% (140/390), still less robust than 
one would expect from a non-arbitrary system among the very worst defendants (and 
recall that the actual rate is less than 36% because of cases missing from the 
Sentencer-Spared and Prosecutor-Spared categories).  Further, Chart 2 for death 
penalty “poster boys” changes little, because virtually every one of these defendants 
accrued 7 or more depravity points, yet the “Overall Death Rate[s]” within the 
subcategories are all over the board. 
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something with which the other jurors would agree.  Thus, as is 
true with most jury outcomes, we can judge performance 
almost exclusively by the results. 
There is, however, one factor that can be characterized 
as regularly recurring: deadlocked juries.180  In almost every 
jury-sentencing jurisdiction, the vote for death must be 
unanimous, and if it is not, the sentence defaults to a non-
death sentence.181 Whether deadlocks result from the holdouts’ 
views of the merits is impossible to determine.  Another 
distinct possibility is that holdouts think they can return a 
death verdict during jury selection, but find that they cannot 
do so when actually faced with the prospect of imposing a death 
sentence, even if on the merits they think a death sentence is 
warranted.182  
Of course, the unanimity requirement furthers the goal 
of imposing death sentences on only the “worst of the worst,” 
because if all twelve jurors can be convinced, one would hope 
the defendant falls into the “worst of the worst” category.183  
But the unanimity rule simultaneously arbitrarily spares some 
of the “worst of the worst” from death sentences—it works as a 
one-way ratchet of leniency placed in the hands of a small 
minority of jurors.  It seems likely that defendants who avoid 
death sentences because the jury deadlocks eleven to one or ten 
to two for death have been spared not because they were not 
among the “worst of the worst,” but because they are among 
  
 180 Of the 120 Sentencer-Spared cases, in eighteen Florida cases, eight 
Delaware cases, and one Alabama case, there could not be a deadlock because the 
jurors merely tallied their votes and reported their tally as a recommendation to the 
judge, who imposed the sentence (giving great deference to the jury’s recommendation).  
Of the remaining 93 cases, juries were deadlocked as to twenty-four defendants, see 
App. E, SS 1, 2, 14, 16, 17, 18, 20, 33, 34, 37, 38, 43, 53, 64, 65, 74, 77, 88, 91, 93, 97, 
100, 111, 118, or about one-quarter of the time.  This undoubtedly understates the 
proportion of deadlocked juries, because one suspects that, relatively often, a jury was 
non-unanimous, but may have nonetheless reported a unanimous verdict for a non-
death sentence in order to resolve the case. 
 181  See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 182  See, e.g., Misti Crane, Killer of 3 Escapes Death Sentence, THE COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH, July 24, 2005, at 01C. (“But while they were considering the death penalty, 
some argued that life in prison would be a stiffer punishment, and one said that he or 
she simply could not sign off on the death penalty.”); Jury Prayed about Nielsen, 
DESERET MORNING NEWS (Salt Lake City, UT), Feb. 6, 2004, at B03 (quoting jury 
member in Cody Nielsen case, see App. E, SS 12, “The one person who wanted life 
without parole made a statement that they knew in their head that the death penalty 
was appropriate, but in their heart they couldn’t do it.”). 
 183 There are twelve defendants in 2004 for whom this hope was in vain.  See 
supra at notes 136-39 and accompanying text, setting forth the twelve 2004 death-
sentenced defendants who were not death-worthy according to the Depravity Point 
Calculator based on the information available in the news reports. 
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the “luckiest of the lucky” to have gotten a stubborn, 
aberrational juror or two on their panels.184  Among the 120 
Sentencer-Spared Defendants, at least eight of them were 
spared death sentences because the jury deadlocked eleven to 
one or ten to two for death.185  Further, this was likely true in 
additional cases, because there were eight reported deadlocks 
without reports of how many jurors were on each side.186  
Further, one suspects that there were additional cases where 
juries reported back unanimous non-death verdicts when the 
jury was irrevocably deadlocked due to one or two anti-death 
holdouts, and the pro-death jurors gave in so that a verdict 
could be returned.  
b. Prosecutorial Reasons 
According to the information in the news reports, 
prosecutors did not pursue death sentences in death-eligible 
cases for both merits-based and non-merits based reasons.  
This section describes reasons prosecutors did not pursue death 
sentences in death-eligible cases, as gleaned from news reports 
and organized by category. 
The first category of merits-based reasons is 
“Guilt/innocence”: the prosecutor believed there were 
significant obstacles to proving the defendant’s guilt.  This 
category is subdivided into four sub-categories: 1) generic 
“Evidence questionable”; 2) a specific problem of questionable 
evidence due to “Multiple perpetrators,” which often makes it 
difficult to prove the degree of culpability of a particular 
  
 184 There were eight such reported deadlocks.  See App. E, SS 2 (10-2), SS 14 
(10-2), SS 17 (11-1), SS 18 (11-1), SS 20 (10-2), SS 65 (10-2), SS 93 (10-2), and SS 111 
(11-1). The jury performs a distinctly different function in capital sentencing than in 
normal guilt or non-guilt determinations.  Requiring unanimity for guilt certainly 
furthers the system’s goal of minimizing wrongful convictions.  But in capital 
sentencing, the goal should not be minimizing death sentences, but imposing death 
sentences on only, and a robust proportion of, the “worst of the worst,” without 
excluding the “worst of the worst” for non-merits-based reasons.  As the Court has 
noted, the jury’s function in capital sentencing is to act as “the conscience of the 
community.”  See Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 382 (1999) (approving strong 
governmental interest in having a jury express conscience of community in death-
sentencing determinations).  If a jury is split eleven to one or ten to two for death, who 
is more representatively expressing the “conscience of the community”:  the eleven and 
ten, or the one and two?  Even votes of nine to three and eight to four for death show 
that the conscience of the community strongly favors death.  It is only when the vote 
reaches seven jurors or fewer for death that there seems to be a substantial case for the 
conscience of the community not favoring death. 
 185 See App. E, SS 2, 14, 17, 18, 20, 65, 93, 111. 
 186 See App. E, SS 43, 33, 64, 74, 88, 91, 97, 118. 
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perpetrator; 3) a specific resolution of the uncertainty in a 
multiple perpetrator case through “Deal given for testimony” to 
one of the perpetrators; and 4) “Prior hung jury,” which relates 
to perceived weakness in the evidence indicated by a prior 
deadlocked jury at the guilt/innocence phase of the defendant’s 
or a co-perpetrator’s trial.   
The second category of merits-based reasons is “Penalty 
Phase”: the prosecutor believed that the potential mitigating 
evidence was so strong that the chances of getting a death 
sentence were not good.  The sub-categories here are: 1) the 
defendant was “Not aggravated enough”; 2) a generic belief 
that the “Mitigation [was] significant,” followed by a list of 
these specific types of mitigation: 3) “Mental problems”; 4) 
“Intoxication”; 5) “Rotten background”; 6) “Youthful age”; 7) 
“Older age/bad health”; 8) “No prior record”; and finally 9) that 
a “Prior hung jury” at the penalty phase of the defendant’s or a 
co-perpetrator’s trial gave reason to doubt a successful death 
sentence outcome.  
The third category pertains to non-merits—and 
therefore arbitrary—reasons prosecutors forego death 
sentences.  The first is “Victim’s relatives’ wishes.”  The news 
reports show that relatives’ wishes fell into one of three 
patterns: relatives were 1) zealous for a death sentence; 2) 
primarily wanted the case resolved, whatever the sentence; and 
3) did not want a death sentence.  These wishes represent an 
arbitrary factor because they do not relate to the aggravation 
or mitigation in a case.  It is entirely unpredictable which 
pattern will prevail, and sometimes the relatives are not all of 
one mind, particularly if there is more than one set of relatives 
because there were multiple victims.  
The second non-merits reason relates to the age of the 
case.  When a “case is old,” it is usually because of an appellate 
reversal or several, although sometimes the age of the case is 
due to a long delay in solving the case or to very long pre-trial 
maneuvering.  In theory, the age of the case could be 
considered a merits-based reason, because evidence can become 
unavailable or less powerful over time.  But given that most of 
these cases are old due to appellate reversals, there is no 
technical evidentiary problem because the new sentencer will 
be instructed that the finding of guilt should be taken as a 
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given,187  and the aggravation for penalty-phase purposes is 
either inherent in the finding of guilt or can be proven by 
reconstituted evidence.188  Further, the very fact that reversible 
error was committed when the case was litigated earlier is 
arbitrary in and of itself.  
The third non-merits reason for a prosecutor to forego a 
death sentence is that it would be too costly for the county to 
prosecute a death penalty case.  A death penalty case costs 
much more than the same case litigated as a non-death-penalty 
case, both in dollar costs, and in the drain on person-power 
from the prosecutor’s staff.189  Some counties simply cannot 
afford to prosecute a death penalty case, while other counties 
can afford the tab (at least for some of their death-eligible 
cases).190  The ability of the county to pay for such a case is as 
arbitrary as a factor can be.   
  
 187 See David McCord, Switching Juries in Midstream: The Perplexities of 
Penalty-Phase-Only Retrials, 2 OH. ST. J. CRIM. L. 215, 232 n.27 (2004) (setting forth 
precedents). 
 188 Id. at 233-40 (explaining law). 
 189 See Charles S. Lanier & James R. Acker, Capital Punishment, the 
Moratorium Movement, and Empirical Questions, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 577, 
588 (2004), suggesting that: 
[C]apital trials in California are six times more expensive to conduct than 
other murder trials, and that taxpayers in that state could save $90 million a 
year by abolishing the death penalty.  Capital trials are so taxing on county 
budgets that they have brought some localities to the verge of bankruptcy.   
There are many reasons why capital punishment is so costly. . . .  Both the 
prosecution and defense must prepare for two hearings in capital cases—the 
guilt-innocence trial and then a separate penalty hearing.  Readying for dual 
proceedings compounds the investigation time, the number of experts 
consulted, and attorneys’ preparation time.  Many jurisdictions require the 
appointment of two defense attorneys for capital trials.  Jury selection is 
especially protracted in capital cases, as voir dire is extended because jurors 
must be “death qualified” before being impaneled.  Individualized voir dire 
also is required in some jurisdictions.  If a capital conviction is secured, the 
penalty trial involves the presentation of new evidence and arguments and 
can be quite time-consuming.  (citations omitted). 
See also Theodore Eisenberg, Death Sentenced Rates and County Demographics: An 
Empirical Study, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 347, 358 (2005) (“[T]he legal system [has] limited 
capacity to process capital cases.  Researchers suggest that the expense of capital cases 
and other factors limit the absolute number of death sentence cases a jurisdiction can 
prosecute. . . .  At the margin, therefore, the prosecution of one capital case likely 
preclude[s] the prosecution of another.”).  See id. at n.40, (citing a news report that 
Harris County, Texas (Houston), tries an abnormally high number of capital cases per 
year owing to a thirty-million dollar budget). 
 190 Apropos of the citation in the preceding footnote, top-level prosecutor Lyn 
McClellan in Harris County said:  “[W]hy are the other counties in Texas not seeking 
the death penalty as often [as Harris County]?  It is likely economic reasons.  Smaller 
counties have to make decisions based on their budgets.  We do not have to make those 
decisions based on economics in Harris County.”  McCord, Switching Juries, supra note 
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A prosecutor may also forego a death sentence in 
exchange for the defendant’s revealing information about 
either the identity of the victims or location of the bodies.  This 
reason is not only non-merits based and completely arbitrary, it 
is perverse.  It rewards a defendant with a non-death sentence 
for having killed additional victims or having carefully hidden 
the bodies.191 
The fifth non-merits reason for a prosecutor to forego a 
death sentence is that the prosecutor had to waive the 
possibility of seeking death in exchange for extradition of the 
defendant from an anti-death-penalty foreign country.  There 
are many countries where this is a necessary condition for 
extradition.192  The 2004 defendants included three for whom 
an agreement was necessary to obtain extradition from 
  
5, at 258.  In the Prosecutor-Spared cases in Appendix F, however, it was rare to catch 
prosecutors acknowledging that they bargain away a death sentence for cost reasons—
only two prosecutors made such statements.  See John Tuohy, Suspect in Muncie 
Slaying Won’t Face Death Penalty, THE INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Nov. 22, 2004, at 1B (“‘We 
wanted it to be resolved fast for the family,’ [prosecutor Judi] Calhoun said.  ‘Death 
penalty cases are expensive and time-consuming.’” [referring to PS 217 in App. F]); 
Jessica Brown, West Gets 2 Life Terms, No Parole, CINCINNATI POST, Aug. 24, 2004, at 
A (“The defense and prosecution said the plea agreement also spared the victims the 
trauma of a trial and saved the taxpayers thousands of dollars.” [referring to PS 110 in 
App. F]).  See also Ashley Rupp, Note, Death Penalty Prosecutorial Charging Decisions 
and County Budgetary Restrictions: Is the Death Penalty Arbitrarily Applied Based on 
County Funding?, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2735 (2003) (noting funding disparities, and 
arguing that they may undermine the constitutionality of capital punishment). 
 191 One cannot let pass the opportunity to mention here a defendant who 
barely missed being in the 2004 database:  “Green River” serial murderer Gary Leon 
Ridgway.  Ridgway admitted to killing forty-eight women in the Seattle area.  He was 
spared a death sentence by the King County prosecutor’s office in exchange for helping 
to locate some of his victims’ bodies.  Ridgway was sentenced in December 2003 to 
forty-eight terms of life-without-parole.  See Gene Johnson, Ridgway Says He’s Sorry 
for Killings, THE COLUMBIAN (Vancouver, WA), Dec. 19, 2003, at A1.  Another 
appalling set of murders out of which no death sentences resulted that barely missed 
qualifying for the 2004 database was the federal prosecution of gang members in 
“Murder, Inc.” in the District of Columbia.  The gang was responsible for at least 
thirty-one murders over about a decade in an attempt to corner the illegal drug market 
in areas of the District.  Death sentences were sought for the two kingpins, Kevin Gray 
and Rodney Moore, but the jury deadlocked in 2003 at the penalty phase.  See Neely 
Tucker, D.C. Killers Get Life after Stalemate on Death Penalty, THE WASH. POST, Mar. 
14, 2003, at B01.  Six other members of the gang were convicted in 2004, but the 
prosecutorial decisions not to seek death sentences against them apparently had been 
made before 2004, so they were not eligible to be included in this article’s database.  
See Carol D. Leonnig, Trial of D.C. Drug Gang Ends with Six Convicted, THE WASH. 
POST, May 11, 2004, at B03. 
 192 For discussion, see Michael J. Kelly, Cheating Justice by Cheating Death: 
The Doctrinal Collision for Prosecuting Foreign Terrorists—Passage of Aut Dedere Aut 
Judicare into Customary Law and Refusal to Extradite Based on the Death Penalty, 20 
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 491, 508 (2003); James Finsten, Note, Extradition or 
Execution?  Policy Constraints in the United States’ War on Terror, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 
835, 837-39 (2004). 
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Canada,193 and three from Mexico.194 This is an arbitrary factor 
because it makes the defendant’s death eligibility turn on 
whether he can get across the border before being arrested.195 
The sixth non-merits reason for a prosecutor’s not 
seeking a death sentence is that the prosecutor is personally 
philosophically opposed to capital punishment.196  It is 
completely arbitrary whether a defendant happens to commit a 
death-eligible crime in a county where he is effectively immune 
from a death sentence due to the prosecutor’s personal 
ideological stance. 
The seventh non-merits reason for foregoing a death 
sentence is a prosecutor’s belief that it will be fruitless to try to 
obtain a death sentence because even if the prosecutor is 
successful, the state’s supreme court is so philosophically 
opposed to capital punishment that it will never permit an 
execution.197  This belief may be entirely rational, but the effect 
  
 193 See App. F, PS 46, 47, 300. 
 194 See App. F, PS 105, 168, 253.  For reporting on the problems of extraditing 
death-eligible defendants from Mexico, see Irene Hsiao & David L. Teibel, Slaying 
Suspects Taking Refuge in Mexico, TUCSON CITIZEN, May 5, 2004, at A1 (detailing 
frustrations of U.S. authorities with attempts to extradite suspected criminals from 
Mexico); Jeff Proctor, Criminals Can’t Hide, ALBUQUERQUE J., Sept. 26, 2004, at B1 
(explaining that extradition is becoming more common, but is still not easy).  
 195 For example, compare the three defendants in the preceding footnote, who 
made it across the border into Canada before being arrested, and who were only 
extradited after American prosecutors agreed not to seek a death sentence, with DS 93 
in App. D, where the defendant was arrested on the American side of the border and 
ultimately sentenced to death.   
 196 The sample provides only one case in which a prosecutor publicly stated 
that she would not seek a death sentence because she was philosophically opposed to 
capital punishment.  See Harriet Chiang, D.A. Defends Decision Not to Seek Execution; 
Her Position has been Clear Since Campaign, She Says, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 25, 2004, at 
B1 (“‘I have been very clear about not seeking the death penalty,’ [Kamala] Harris said, 
reminding others of the campaign pledge that she made.” [referring to PS 125 in App. 
F]).  Local variations based on prosecutors’ ideas about the moral acceptability of 
capital punishment are well known.  See, e.g., John Gleeson, Supervising Federal 
Capital Punishment:  Why the Attorney General Should Defer When U.S. Attorneys 
Recommend Against the Death Penalty, 89 VA. L. REV. 1697, 1718 (2003):  
Within New York State, where the district attorneys are elected, some 
district attorneys, particularly in New York City, rarely or never seek the 
death penalty despite numerous death-eligible cases.  Some district attorneys 
in upstate counties seek it often. . . . On the same set of facts, the District 
Attorney in Monroe County in upstate New York will be far more confident 
that the death penalty is appropriate—and that the jury will impose it—than 
the District Attorney in the Bronx, who has never sought the death penalty 
and has publicly stated that he never will. 
 197 Prosecutors in four cases in the sample had the temerity to make such 
statements about appellate courts, although two of the four were oblique references.  
See Keith Herbert, Man, 25, Makes Deal in Murder; He was Obsessed with his Co-
worker, Authorities Said.  By Pleading Guilty in the ‘02 Case, He Avoids the Death 
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is arbitrary—the defendant’s death-eligibility turns not on the 
merits of the case, but on a judicial attitude of disapproval 
toward a legitimate state law (or a prosecutor’s perception of 
that attitude).    
The final non-merits reason for a prosecutor not to 
pursue a death sentence is the prosecutor’s belief that juries in 
the jurisdiction are death-averse, and that it will likely be 
fruitless to try for a death sentence.198  This could conceivably 
be characterized as a merits-based reason that simply 
recognizes legitimate local variation in appetites for death 
sentences.  But there are two responsive arguments: 1) local 
variation is not a virtue to be cherished when it results in 
arbitrary imposition or non-imposition of death sentences;199 
and 2) prosecutors do not think they can impanel a jury that 
will unanimously vote for death—the problems of arbitrariness 
when even one juror can veto a death sentence have already 
been discussed.200 
In the expanded Appendix F,201 after each Prosecutor-
Spared defendant is a grid identifying the discernable reasons 
(if any) a prosecutor did not pursue a death sentence.  A reason 
stated by a prosecutor is indicated by an “s,” and a reason not 
  
Penalty, PHIL. INQUIRER, July 27, 2004, at B01 (“The death penalty isn’t carried out in 
Pennsylvania as often as in Texas or Virginia, which was another factor in accepting 
Vample’s plea, [prosecutor Kevin] Steele said.” [referring to PS 161 in App. F]); Jim 
O’Neill, Man, 21, Admits Killing his Uncle, 59, Avoids Death Penalty by Pleading 
Guilty, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Jan. 14, 2004, at 29 (“‘In all likelihood, the [state] 
Supreme Court will never allow anyone to be executed in New Jersey,” said prosecutor 
Thomas Kapsak. [referring to PS 102 in App. F]); Byron Rohrig, Man Pleads Guilty in 
Librarian’s Death, EVANSVILLE COURIER PRESS (Ind.), Nov. 2, 2004, at A5 (“Posey 
County Prosecutor Jodi Uebelhack announced she wouldn’t pursue the death penalty.  
‘If there was some guarantee he’d actually get executed if sentenced to the death 
penalty, maybe it would make it worth it.’” [referring to PS 49 in App. F]); Michelle 
Sahn, Prosecutor:  Justices Won’t Abide Punishment; Defense Wins Ruling on 
Testimony.  Second Death Penalty Falls; State Supreme Court Upholds Conviction, 
HOME NEWS TRIB. (N.J.), Mar. 26, 2004, at A1 (Prosecutor Thomas Kapsak again:  “No 
matter how heinous the crime, this [state] Supreme Court will never allow a defendant 
to receive the maximum penalty provided by law. . . .” [referring to PS 170 in App. F]). 
 198 A prosecutor made such a statement in only one case in the sample.  See 
Tuohy, supra note 190 (“‘With the tenor of juries these days, I think they are less likely 
to enforce death penalties,’ [the prosecutor] said.” [referring to PS 217 in App. F]).   
 199 For a well-argued rendition of the argument that many variations in 
death-sentencing ratios are legitimate products of local sentiments, as reflected by the 
decisions of local prosecutors, see Gleeson, supra note 196, at 1713-15 (“U.S. Attorneys 
know the strengths and weaknesses of their cases, the likelihood that juries will 
convict, the particular resource allocation issues in their districts, and how the 
communities they serve and protect perceive crimes and evaluate punishments.”).  This 
argument has similar force as to county attorneys within a state system.  
 200 See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text. 
 201 Uncondensed Appendices, supra note 103, at App. F. 
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stated but reasonably inferable is indicated by an “i.”  The 
summaries of prosecutorial reasons, below, will focus on the 
stated reasons.   
 Prosecutors were rather close-mouthed to the press 
about their reasons for foregoing death sentences.  Prosecutors 
stated reasons as to only less than one-third of the Prosecutor-
Spared202 defendants (94/323 (although sometimes they stated 
more than one reason).  In fifteen additional defendants’ cases, 
prosecutors’ giving one defendant in a multiple perpetrator 
case a deal in exchange for testimony against one of the other 
perpetrators was tantamount to a statement of a reason; and in 
another six defendants’ cases, prosecutors were obliged to 
waive death- sentencing in return for an agreement by 
Canadian or Mexican authorities to extradite the defendants.  
Thus, as to less than half of the Prosecutor-Spared cases 
(115/323) there are prosecutorial reasons on record explaining 
why a death sentence was not pursued.  Here is Chart 3, which 
presents a summary of the stated reasons prosecutors spared 
those 115 defendants (the reasons total more than 115 because 
sometimes prosecutors state multiple reasons):  
Chart 3:  Prosecutorial Reasons for Not Pursuing Death Sentence 
Guilt/Innocence 
Evidence questionable 12
Multiple perpetrators 15
Deal given for testimony 15
Prior hung jury, etc. 
Penalty phase 
Not aggravated enough 3
Mitigation significant 3
Mental problems 7
Intoxication 
Rotten background 2
Youthful age 5
Older age 2
No prior record 6
Prior hung jury, etc. 
Non-merits 
Victim’s relatives’ wishes 38
Case is old 5
Cost 3
Defendant to name other victims 5
Waiver for extradition 6
  
 202 Usually a prosecutor spares a defendant through a plea bargain, but 
occasionally the prosecutor announces the intent not to pursue a death sentence even 
without a plea bargain. 
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Prosecutor opposed to 1
Prosecutor doubts appellate 4
Prosecutor doubts juries 2
 
Chart 3 shows almost an equal number of merits-based 
and non-merits-based reasons: seventy to sixty-four.  Thus, 
almost half the reasons on record for not pursuing death 
sentences were unrelated to the merits of the cases.   
Of particular significance is that the single most-cited 
reason, by far, was the non-merits-based “Victims’ relatives 
wishes.”  This is disturbing enough in itself, but there is 
something deeper buried here.  Even though “Cost,” 
“Prosecutor doubts appellate [courts],” and “Prosecutor doubts 
juries” were rarely mentioned, from a real-world standpoint 
there is surely a close, unstated connection among these four 
reasons.  There must certainly be cases involving the cost-
minded, gun-shy prosecutor who persuades/manipulates/hides 
behind the victim’s relatives.  One may imagine a prosecutor’s 
thought process: “This is a terrible crime, one that really ought 
to be pursued as a death penalty case.  But my office’s budget 
can’t afford it, nor can we spare the lawyer and staff resources 
to do it right.  Even if we pursue a death sentence, there’s a 
good chance of ending up with at least one hold-out juror.  And 
even if we get a death sentence, our state supreme court is 
eager to find any reason to overturn a death sentence (or if the 
state supreme court doesn’t, some federal court probably will 
during the habeas corpus litigation)—then the case will be 
right back in our laps again, looking like we bungled it the first 
time.  Now, if I explain all this to the victim’s relatives, and 
exert a little pressure by playing up how long they will be in 
limbo, they might agree to a non-death plea.  Then I can look 
honorable in the media by saying that I bargained the case out 
of consideration for the victim’s relatives.”  This line of 
reasoning spares defendants from death sentences for a 
potpourri of non-merits reasons. 
Appendix G sets forth a summary of the reasons 
prosecutors do not pursue death sentences that can be inferred 
from the news reports, even though prosecutors did not state 
them as reasons.  Appendix G illustrates that the two most 
common inferable reasons for prosecutors to forego pursuing 
death sentences are the evidentiary problems presented by 
multiple perpetrators (a merits-based factor), and the age of 
the cases (usually a non-merits-based factor).  The remainder 
of the reasons primarily relate to human frailty mitigation 
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that, as discussed above, is indistinguishable as between 
evidence from Death-Sentenced and Sentencer-Spared cases. 
H. A Summary Based on the Empirical Data:  An Inference of 
an Arbitrary System 
The analysis of the news reports raises a strong 
inference that the death penalty system fails the four-part 
litmus test for non-arbitrariness: the system may persist in 
over-including defendants who are not among the “worst of the 
worst” murderers, does not generate sufficiently robust death-
sentencing rates among the “worst of the worst,” does not 
produce a death sentencing rate that increases entirely 
predictably with the aggravation level of the offenses, and does 
not assure merits-based reasons  for defendants being spared 
death sentences.  Here are some facts to ponder that support 
this inference: 
  Death sentences were imposed on fewer than half (28/64) of the 
defendants who accrued 20 or more depravity points—murderers 
who were so ridiculously or enormously aggravated that it boggles 
the mind; 
  272 murderers who did not receive death sentences were more 
depraved than the 17 least depraved defendants who did; 
  159 murderers who did not receive death sentences were more 
depraved than about the bottom one-third of those who did (43); 
  Terrorist bomber Terry Nichols, convicted of killing 161 people, was 
spared a death sentence by a jury, probably because he “found Jesus” 
in the Bible Belt;203 serial killers Charles Cullen and Richard White 
were spared death sentences by prosecutors in return for identifying 
their victims or the whereabouts of their remains;204 yet Cory Maye, 
who was minding his own business in his bedroom when the police 
launched a raid and he shot one of them with a bullet that just 
missed hitting the officer’s bulletproof vest, was death-sentenced by 
a jury.205 
A system that produces such arbitrary results should be 
subject to serious attack under a renewed Furman analysis.  
Echoing Justice White in Furman, there is a strong inference 
that in the existing system: “[T]he death penalty is exacted 
with great infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes 
and . . . there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few 
  
 203 See App. E, SS 1. 
 204 See App. F, PS 1, 5. 
 205 See App. D, DS 140. 
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cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is 
not.”206  It seems likely that death penalty lightning has been 
striking ever since Furman. 
III.  DOES THIS ARGUMENT HAVE ANY PROSPECT OF SUCCESS? 
From a practical litigation standpoint, there is a 
maddening conundrum in trying to invoke Furman’s 
nationwide outcomes holding: only the U. S. Supreme Court is 
in a position to utilize it, yet an issue can only arrive at the 
Court after being properly presented during lower court 
proceedings.  Let’s imagine litigation scenarios for trying to 
raise a renewed Furman challenge, first through a state 
system, and then through the federal system. 
A. Practical Challenges 
Through a state system: To concretely illustrate the 
conundrum, imagine a death-eligible litigant—let’s call him 
Doe—who is charged in a particular state—let’s say 
Pennsylvania.  Suppose Doe’s attorney wants to make a 
Furman-based Eighth Amendment challenge.  Doe’s attorney 
cannot argue to a Pennsylvania court that the nationwide 
death penalty system should be declared unconstitutional for 
arbitrariness.  A Pennsylvania court has no power to make 
rulings about the constitutionality of any other jurisdiction’s 
death penalty system.  Pennsylvania courts would properly 
insist on evidence that Pennsylvania’s system is operating 
arbitrarily.  At most, a Pennsylvania court might be willing to 
consider nationwide evidence as secondary support for a 
finding of arbitrariness in the Pennsylvania system.   
Through the federal system: A federal habeas challenge 
to a state death sentence cannot accommodate a nationwide 
Furman challenge.  Imagine that Doe failed in his challenge to 
the Pennsylvania system and has now filed a habeas petition in 
federal court in Pennsylvania.  Under prevailing rules, only 
issues that were raised in state court proceedings can be 
litigated in a federal habeas proceeding.207  As we just saw, Doe 
could not effectively raise a nationwide arbitrariness challenge 
  
 206 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring). 
 207 See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977) (establishing that, in 
order for a claim not to be waived for purposes of federal habeas review, the applicant 
must have litigated it correctly in state system, subject to very narrow exception). 
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in the Pennsylvania courts.  Neither can a federal death 
penalty defendant effectively raise a renewed Furman 
challenge.  Imagine litigant Roe, who is battling the prospect of 
a death sentence in federal court.  Roe is in no different 
position than Doe: Roe can only challenge the constitutionality 
of the system in which he is charged—in his case, the federal 
death penalty system. 
B. A Potentially Workable Challenge 
Is there no prospect, then, of ever successfully raising, 
let alone prevailing on, a renewed Furman challenge?  While 
hope is slim, it is not nonexistent.  Here is a possible scenario.  
First, the best states in which to raise the challenge should be 
determined by a legal strategy team.  The best states would 
have the following combination of factors: a bad factual record 
for arbitrary results,208 a state supreme court that is skeptical 
of capital punishment, and, as a fallback in case certiorari is 
not granted on direct review, at least one federal district court 
habeas judge who is likewise skeptical.  Since the argument 
will have to focus on the specific state system, relying on news 
report data from one year would not be ideal—preferably, data 
from several prior years would be unearthed and analyzed 
using the Baldus technique.  Once the argument is crafted at 
its best, death penalty defense lawyers with cases in the early 
stages of litigation should be recruited to file a pre-trial motion 
arguing that the state’s death penalty system is 
unconstitutional on a renewed Furman basis.  Eventually, at 
  
 208 Pennsylvania would be a good candidate.  That state had thirty-eight 
defendants in the database.  As to the eleven most depraved defendants, Pennsylvania 
had two death sentences (in App. D, DS 21 (23 points) and DS 38 (17 points)); three 
spared by sentencers (in App. E, SS 7 (24 points), SS 33 (12 points), and SS 38 (12 
points)); and six spared by prosecutors (in App. F, PS 1 (198 points), PS 11 (26 points), 
PS 12 (26 points), PS 23 (20 points), PS 44 (16 points), and PS 45 (15 points)).  Thus, 
the four most depraved defendants escaped death sentences, as did six of the top eight, 
and nine of the top eleven.  On the other hand, two of the five death sentences (DS 137 
(4 points) and DS 138 (3 points)), were not death-eligible according to the Depravity 
Point Calculator (see supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text).  Ohio would be 
another good candidate. A great deal of data is available about the Ohio system due to 
a massive study of statewide murder cases over a twenty-year period from 1981-2002 
undertaken by the Associated Press under the direction of reporter Andrew Welsh-
Huggins.  For reports of the results of this effort, see Andrew Welsh-Huggins, Killers 
Avoid Death Penalty, CINCINNATI POST, June 6, 2005, at A1 (noting seemingly 
irrational disparities based on number of victims and other factors); Andrew Welsh-
Huggins, Death Row Odds Vary, AKRON BEACON J., May 7, 2005, at A1 (detailing 
seeming anomalies throughout the state where some defendants who avoided death 
sentences looked worse than some defendants who received death sentences). 
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least one of those defendants would be sentenced to death, and 
would be able to litigate the issue in a state appeal and in a 
federal habeas proceeding.  This, in turn, could lead to a 
successful certiorari petition to the Court.   
Envision now that the Court has chosen to review this 
issue—what could allow a renewed Furman argument to 
prevail?  Resorting to the catch phrase from an old movie, at 
least five members of the Court would have to feel like 
screaming about the death penalty: “I’m mad as hell, and I’m 
not going to take it anymore!”209  That was the mindset of the 
five Justices in the majority in Furman—they had seen enough 
of the arbitrary operation of the death penalty over the years 
that they were willing to abandon their usual case-by-case, 
issue-by-issue approach, and stop the whole system in its 
tracks.  And that was the position at which Justice Blackmun 
later arrived.210  While there is no explicit indication that five 
  
 209 This is the catchphrase from the 1976 Academy Award nominated film 
“Network,” originally uttered by the character of disillusioned news broadcaster 
Howard Beale (played by Peter Finch) that becomes a national slogan.  It ranks as 
number nineteen in a list of the 100 greatest movie lines in a recent poll by the 
American Film Institute.  American Film Institute, AFI’s 100 Years. . . 100 Movie 
Quotes, http://www.afi.com/tvevents/100years/quotes.aspx#list (last visited Jan. 28, 
2006).  A version of this slogan could be inferred from the following comment in a state 
bar publication about the Oregon death penalty system:  
By keeping the death penalty in Oregon we show that we continue to be 
“tough on crime,” but on whom are we tough?  Certainly not the worst.  We 
will kill the junkie who happens to murder a person who didn’t pay his “bills”; 
a person high on methamphetamine who killed a hitchhiker he picked up; a 
drunken person who killed someone chasing him.  But, we can’t kill a man 
who sawed seven women to death, another who killed his family, or one who 
sexually assaulted and then murdered two of his own daughter’s friends and 
then conducted media interviews on the slab under which one was buried. 
Maintaining the Oregon death penalty in the face of these new realities is the 
acme of hypocrisy. 
William R. Long, The Odyssey of Oregon’s Death Penalty, 65 OR. ST. B. BULL 70 (Nov. 
2004).  See also Editorial, Death Penalty in N.J. is a Farce, OCEAN COUNTY OBSERVER 
(Toms River, N.J.), Apr. 11, 2004, at A16 (“It is a farce, mere show, New Jersey’s death 
penalty law. . . . No one, least of all [death-sentenced killer Robert Marshall, whose 
death sentence was reversed twenty-two years after the crime] believes he or anyone 
else will be executed for murder in New Jersey.”); Five Murders, Life Term; So Scrap 
Death Penalty, PALM BEACH POST, Dec. 16, 2004, at 22A (“If anyone deserved the death 
penalty, it was Michael Roman.  He killed five members of a Lake Worth family two 
years ago.  The murders were calculated.  One victim was a pregnant woman.  Even 
after all this time, he shows no remorse. . . . [Prosecutor] Krischer says this case is 
‘unique.’  But when a pro-death penalty prosecutor who says he doesn’t use the 
punishment as a bargaining chip is satisfied to sign off on a deal that spares the life of 
a mass murderer, those ‘unique’ circumstances indict every death case in Florida.”).  
 210 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(“Rather than continue to coddle the Court’s delusion that the desired level of fairness 
[in administering the death penalty] has been achieved and the need for regulation 
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current Justices have lost their stomach for the existing system 
of capital punishment, there are some indications that 
majorities of the Court have not been thrilled in recent years 
with some aspects of the system’s operation.211   
The difficulty in inducing the Court to declare the 
existing system unconstitutionally arbitrary, however, should 
not be underestimated.  The Furman Court had no hand in 
creating the pre-Furman system, and did not have to admit 
any mistakes of its own in overturning that system.  By 
contrast, the current Court and its predecessors going back to 
Furman have played a large role (along with state legislatures 
and lower courts) in creating the current system.  If it were to 
rule the current system unconstitutional, the Court would have 
to acknowledge that much of its capital jurisprudence over the 
last three decades has been a colossal mistake.212  While it 
  
eviscerated, I feel morally and intellectually obligated simply to concede that the death 
penalty experiment has failed.”).  Justice Scalia also thinks the existing system of 
capital punishment is arbitrary.  See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 664 (1990) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that to speak of guided discretion and individualized 
sentencing is “rather like referring to the twin objectives of good and evil”).  Justice 
Scalia’s solution, though, would be to abandon the individualized sentencing principle 
as a constitutional requirement.  Id. at 673.  Likewise, Justice Thomas has serious 
qualms about the rationality of the existing system.  See Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 
461, 494 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“When our review of death penalty 
procedures turns on whether jurors can give ‘full mitigating effect’ to a defendant’s 
background and character, and on whether juries are free to disregard the State’s 
chosen sentencing criteria and return a verdict that a majority of this Court will label 
‘moral,’ we have thrown open the back door to arbitrary and irrational sentencing.”).  
Justice Thomas’s solution is to substantially deregulate the constitutional requirement 
for sentencers’ consideration of mitigating evidence, allowing jurisdictions to “channel 
the sentencer’s consideration of a defendant’s arguably mitigating evidence so as to 
limit the relevance of that evidence in any reasonable manner, so long as the State 
does not deny a defendant a full and fair opportunity to apprise the sentencer of all 
constitutionally relevant circumstances.”  Id. at 498-99. 
 211 See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S.Ct. 2456 (2005) (reversing death 
sentence for ineffective assistance of counsel); Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S.Ct. 2317 
(2005) (reversing capital conviction because prosecutor unconstitutionally exercised 
peremptory challenges on the basis of race); Deck v. Missouri, 125 S.Ct. 2007 (2005) 
(reversing death sentence because defendant was shackled in the jury’s presence 
without any special indicia of dangerousness); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) 
(holding death sentence unconstitutional for offenders who were less than eighteen 
years of age at the time of the murder); Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 703-05 (2004) 
(holding that death-sentenced Texas defendant could raise claim in federal habeas case 
that exculpatory evidence regarding witness’s government informant status had been 
wrongly withheld, having established cause and prejudice to avoid procedural default); 
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 537-38 (2003) (finding inadequate investigation of 
possible mitigation evidence constituted ineffective assistance of counsel); Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding death sentence unconstitutional for 
defendant who was mentally retarded at the time of the murder). 
 212 In an earlier article, I argued that the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence 
had achieved mild success in decreasing over-inclusion.  See McCord, Judging the 
Effectiveness, supra note 45, at 595.  I stand by that conclusion.  But a modest decrease 
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would be extremely difficult for a Justice to admit this colossal 
mistake, it is not impossible, as is evidenced by Justice 
Blackmun’s end-of-career turnabout.213 
Suppose five Justices made similar turnabouts.  What 
would that mean for more than 3400 other death row inmates?  
One would hope for a decision that would be equally damning 
to all states’ systems, as was the decision in Furman.  Recall 
that in Furman the commonality of all the state systems in 
allowing unfettered discretion to the sentencer meant all those 
systems were doomed.  The common failings one would hope 
the Court would find in current systems include:  
Lack of state-level oversight to assure consistent 
decision making across all counties in seeking or not 
seeking death sentences; 214 
Lack of state-level funding to assure that county-level 
resource shortfalls are not the cause of foregoing 
seeking death sentences; and to assure well-trained and 
compensated capital defenders and support services; 
Lack of any controls over prosecutorial discretion to 
pursue/not pursue death sentences;  
Lack of sufficiently tightly drawn standards of death-
eligibility to screen out all insufficiently aggravated 
murderers. 
Arbitrariness from requiring unanimous jury verdicts 
for death.215 
  
in over-inclusion does not suffice to make the death penalty system non-arbitrary, as I 
hope the current Article demonstrates. 
 213 See supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
 214 The federal system, in which there is centralized oversight for decisions to 
seek or forego death sentences, does a fairly good job of selecting only highly 
aggravated cases to take to sentencers.  Here are the federal cases in the databases, 
with the number of depravity points for each in parentheses:  in App. D, DS 12 (30 
points), 20 (23 points), 22 (22 points), 43 (16 points), 54 (15 points), 82 (11 points), 93 
(10 points); and in App. E, SS 4 (29 points), 5 (29 points), 41 (11 points), 42 (11 points), 
46 (11 points), 47 (11 points), 64 (8 points), 86 (6 points), 109 (4 points), 114 (4 points).  
The federal system does not select all of the most aggravated defendants, though, nor 
did it achieve a particularly impressive death-sentencing rate with sentencers, thereby 
demonstrating the difficulty in creating a non-arbitrary system.  Yet the results—a 
marginally robust 41% death-sentencing rate in cases that went to a death penalty 
decision by a sentencer—underscores the difficulty of creating a non-arbitrary system. 
 215 The Court has permitted the use of non-unanimous verdicts in criminal 
cases.  See Apodoca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406 (1972) (guilty verdict by nine of twelve 
jurors is constitutionally acceptable).  But it would require standing history and 
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One would then hope for one thing further from the 
Court—for it to simultaneously vacate all the death sentences 
on its docket, just as it did in conjunction with Furman.  This 
would send two necessary messages.  First, it would indicate 
that individual states do not have the chance to argue that 
their systems are not arbitrary.  Second, it would indicate that 
the decision is for the benefit of all currently death-sentenced 
inmates, regardless of whether they have a direct appeal 
pending; that is, that the decision has complete retroactive 
effect.  This would empty death rows of their over 3400 
inmates, just as Furman emptied death rows of over 600 
inmates. 
Such a result would be extraordinary, just as Furman 
was.  The Court does, however, have an oft-affirmed doctrinal 
device that can be used to justify radical departures from 
constitutional doctrines that prevail as to non-death cases: 
“Death is different.”216 
CONCLUSION:  WHAT IF . . . 
If the Court accepted a renewed Furman argument, and 
stopped the current death-sentencing system dead in its 
tracks—what would happen then?  Undoubtedly, just what 
happened after Furman—the committed death penalty states 
would go back to the drawing boards and create new systems.  
There are, admittedly, rational approaches to attempt to 
construct a non-arbitrary system.217  But can any system 
operate non-arbitrarily?  We have tried for over three hundred 
years to create a non-arbitrary system in the United States.  
Nobody believes we have succeeded at any point along the way.  
After such extensive failed experimentation, is there any 
persuasive reason to believe that a non-arbitrary death penalty 
system, even if theoretically imaginable, is practically 
attainable? 
  
tradition on its head for the Court to ban the use of unanimous verdicts in the penalty 
phase of capital cases.  Yet such a holding would be required if the Court truly wanted 
to achieve a non-arbitrary death penalty system.   
 216 The whole of the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence is premised on the 
proposition that death is so different from any other punishment that it requires 
special constitutional safeguards.  See Jeffrey Abramson, Death-is-Different 
Jurisprudence and the Role of the Capital Jury, 2 OH. ST. J. CRIM. L. 117, 117 n.1 
(2004) (collecting cases citing this proposition). 
 217 See, e.g., David McCord, An Open Letter To Governor George Ryan 
Concerning How to Fix the Death Penalty System, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 451, 452 (2001) 
(recommending changes that might result in a less arbitrary death penalty system). 
